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By trying to make everything too nice, incorporationism represses
contradictions. It usurps women's language in order to further define
the world in the male image; it thus deprives women of the power of
naming. Incorporationism means to give over the world, because it
means to say to those in power: "We will use your language and will
let you interpret it. "I
[Women's history has] disabused us of the notion that the history of
women is the same as the history of men, and that the significant
turning points in history have the same impact for one sex as for
another.
2
Sexual violence was a step in the process of destruction of the [T]utsi
group--destruction of the spirit, of the will to live, and of life itself3
International law has historically avoided regulating sex-based violence
directed toward women in times of war. States saw little strategic interest in
addressing such "private" concerns in the public arena of treaties or
international courts. As armed confrontation between and within states was
generally carried out by male combatants, the laws of war were generally
constructed from the vista of a soldier's need for ordered rules within which to
wage war on behalf of the state. Consequently, women's interests fared
notoriously badly when accountability was sought for the behavior of
combatants. In particular, sex-based violence was spectacularly unregulated
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by international law. By sex-based violence I mean a wide variety of violent
and victimizing acts directed at women because of their gender.4
Despite augmented accountability for acts of violence directed at women
during armed conflict, problems persist. The reason for this is two-fold. First,
despite much recent legal and sociological writing, there remains a limited
understanding of the functionality of sex-based violence during war. There is
ongoing intellectual and legal resistance to accepting the extensive empirical
evidence that women's bodies have been targeted as a method and means of
war, not ancillary to military objectives, but innately linked to them.5 For law
to be effective it must co-relate sanction to the experience of the victim.
Exploring the military functions served by sexual violence makes evident that
there is a pressing need to rethink traditional legal conceptualizations of and
sanction related to acts of violence directed at women in situations of conflict.
Only by fully comprehending and naming the intentions that underlie the
prevalent attacks on women's bodies can we put in place a sheme of legal
sanctions that would name and place the harms caused-relative to the
victim's experience and the perpetrator's intentions. This article seeks to
encourage legal scholars and law-makers to look again at legal categorizations
and to ask whether they are effective and adequate in facilitating
accountability for sex-based violence during conflict.
Sex-based violence serves multiple functions in war. It conflates the
achievement of broader military objectives with acts that are aimed at women
precisely because of their gender. Identifying both causes is critical to putting
in place legal structures that are sufficient to remedy the harms experienced by
women. Acknowledging multiple causality for gendered violation, however,
does not mean that there is an equality of causes, or that causality makes no
difference to the forms of sanction which ought to be put in place to prevent
the recurrence of such acts. To start, this article identifies that there is a
general underdevelopment of sanctions pertaining to sexual violation during
situations of conflict. The article further explores the extent to which there are
particular aspects of gendered violence during war which are entirely absented
from legal scrutiny.
This lacunae of scrutiny is explored by analysis of and reflection upon
new empirical research of sexual violation which occurred during the
Holocaust. Thus, the article has a specific empirical basis, an assessment of
the lived experiences of sexual violation by women during the Holocaust-
4. I use the term sex-based violence in conscious contradistinction to the phrase sexual violence. While
many commentators use the term sexual violence in contexts that I discuss in this article, I am persuaded that
it focuses attention on penetrative sexual acts, rather than on a wider veriety of violent acts that are causally
linked to the gander of the victim.
5. What is also significantly underestimated is the extent to which violence against women increases
dramatically during times of civil stress and tension. For example, it is reported that in the violence that
preempted the fall from power of the Indonesian President Suharto, significant numbers of ethnic Chinese
women were sexually assaulted and raped in Jakarta. Aid-workers reported that up to 100 women were
targeted in Jakarta in this manner. See Seth Mydans, Jakarta Groups Document Mass Rapes of Chinese,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 10, 1998 at Al.
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predominantly of Jewish women-based upon archival research of the
period.6 While it is inappropriate to describe the Holocaust experience itself as
war, its horrors occurred in the context of war, and thus post facto legal
accountability came under the legal rubric of international humanitarian law.
While the Holocaust is testiment to violation in extremity, it serves as a
unique prism from which to draw wider conclusions. By looking at the
Holocaust, we gain an understanding of a variety of experiences, violations
and harms that women endure in numerous armed conflict situations (albeit in
varying and less institutionally structured ways), precisely because of their
gender.
Dealing with the unparalleled violence perpetrated upon men and women
during the Holocaust is beyond the scope of any one article. Nor is a
concentration upon the specific experiences of women during the Holocaust
intended to diminish the horrors and indignities suffered by men during the
same period. I concur fully with the approach of Weitzman and Ofer in their
seminal study, entitled Women in the Holocaust, when they say:
We are not asserting that women's experiences during the Holocaust
were totally different from those of men. That would be as false and
misleading as to argue that their experiences were identical to
men's . . . . Nevertheless, scholars . . . must be attentive to the
differences between men and women just as we must be attentive to
other social differences among Jews, such as those between religious
and secular Jews, or those among Jews of different social classes.
7
The article starts from the simple proposition that many women
experienced different forms of violation because of their gender during the
Holocaust. Nonetheless, while I focus on violations, I also acknowledge that
gender difference does not always imply greater victimization, and that some
research has indicated that gender differences functioned to protect women in
contradistinction to men in similar positions during the Holocaust. Ringelheim
notes that when one examines the social history of women during the period,
"... such as the different roles and functions of Jewish women and men in the
ghettos with respect to work, housing, and food; the differences in the male
and female death rates in the ghettos; the differences in the structure of the
women's and men's camp in Auschwitz-Birkenau.. . ", one identifies a more
detailed and complex story about the experiences of both genders during the
6. The archival research was undertaken at Yad Vashem Holocaust Museum and is based on access to
individual files, of which 23 individual testimonies form the basis for the narratives quoted in section B.
Further empirical details are drawn from another 23 published personal narratives. Clearly, a gendered
perspective on the experiences of the Holocaust could also usefully examine the unique experiences of men
during the same time, including such matters as circumcision and the inability to provide for family
sustenance, as pivotal to traditional male roles. Such investigation was outside the scope of the present study,
but the author acknowledges that a gendered experience of the Holocaust is not exclusively female.
7. lenore J. Weitzman & Dalia Ofer, The Role of Gender in the Holocaust, WOMEN IN THE HOLOCAUST
2 (Lenore J. Weitzman & Dalia Ofer eds., 1998).
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Holocaust.8 I therefore concede from the beginning that gendered violation
does not necessarily imply more victimization for women or the potential
overlap of violations for women and men during this time.
Empirical assessment is particularly important as we reassess the
adequacy of international legal responses to sexual violation. Taking a close
look at women's experiences during the Holocaust is critical, because
violations of human rights during the Holocaust formed the bedrock upon
which post-war international legal structures of accountability were
assembled. Human rights and humanitarian law standards have a direct
geneology derived from the horrifying experience of the Holocaust. The post-
war augmentation of the laws of war found in the Geneva Conventions of
1949 and the international consensus on the articulation of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 are both early manifestations of this
lineage. The validation and creation of collective memory, both in the
immediate aftermath of the Holocaust and since then, have indelibly affected
the legal mechanisms that have sprung from that time. 9 If we explore the
possibility that certain discussions and certain violations were silenced or
erased during that creation process, we also acknowledge that the legal
mechanisms of accountability may be inadequate in certain respects. In
reassessing the nature and form of the harms experienced during the
Holocaust, we may also come to have a deeper awareness of the concept of
harm itself. This allows a potentially greater flexibility in marrying a notion of
harm with an appropriate legal sanction. In acknowledging the limitations of
the legal pedigree, I suggest that we can create an alternative prism from
which to rethink existing models of entitlement, rights, and accountability.
Section A of the article starts by exploring the limitations of modem legal
language in defining and particularizing the experiences of women during the
Holocaust. It points to the dangers for reader and writer alike in assuming the
capacity of legal language to reduce the experience of violation to a form
which conveys the experience sufficient to punish or to remedy it. Section B
presents the empirical information that forms the backdrop to this analysis.
This section highlights the two facets of women's Holocaust experience; first,
narratives and stories of the ghettos and second, the extremity of violations
suffered by women in the concentration camps. Following this, section C
analyzes the concept of harm. In partidular, I assess the harms of maternal
separation and sexual erasure, demonstrating the inability of international law
to articulate these acts as sexual harms, and illustrating the limited attention
and imagination directed towards accounting for the specific harms that
women suffer during war. This section highlights the extent to which
8. Joan Ringelheim, The Split between Gender and the Holocaust, in WOMEN IN THE HOLOCAUST,
supra note 7, at 346.
9. For a thoughtful and provoking account of the extent to which criminal trials have functioned to
shape questions of collective memory and national identity in societies which have experienced large-scale
brutality, see MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY AND THE LAW (1996).
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particular indignities were not only aimed at women's sexual identity, but
were intended to achieve broader military objectives. Section D confronts the
manner in which international humanitarian law has historically excluded
women from its ambit of protection. Moreover, it sets out the extent to which
only certain privileged aspects of women's sexual and personal identity are
awarded legal status, confirming a pattern of exclusion. Subsequently, Section
E examines the interface between the post-war human rights regime and the
legal protections developed for women who experience sexual violation. The
conclusions markedly illustrate the extent to which the central paradigm of
autonomy, upon which modem human rights discourse is founded, may be
inadequate to encompass the nature of the harm experienced, not only by
individual women, but by their wider communities. The article concludes by
reflecting on where international standards of protection may progress to and
what may be learnt, by lawmakers and others, from historical reflection.
I. CONFRONTING THE LANGUAGE OF VIOLATION
Given the extensive corpus of literature devoted to the Holocaust, it may
be surprising to note that there is a distinct gap of reflection, analysis, and
qualification in the area of sexual violence. 10 The augmented literature that
has emerged in recent years on sexual violence during war, has confirmed that
women do in fact experience particular kinds of indignities and violations
during war, and are vulnerable in unique ways because of their gender. Could
it be that such particularities did not occur during the Holocaust? Was there
such an array of brutal and dehumanizing activities occurring during the time
that sexual violation paled in comparison to the other dehumanizing crimes
being committed? Were women not asked or did they not report such
experiences when and after they occurred? All of these questions are obvious
given the lacunae in the existing literature.
Archival accounts of the Holocaust make it quite clear that women
experienced unique forms of indignity and violation during the war.11 But
such indignity is only part of a much more complicated story for the legal
analyst. The first caution to the reader and researcher is that coming to
primary accounts of the Holocaust requires a reassessment of the analytical
and intellectual tools taken for granted in other endeavors. In a parallel
context, Aharon Applefeld describes the process of engagement with
representations of the Holocaust:
10. Moreover, as Joan Ringelheim notes, "Literature on the Holocaust has been apparently gender
neutral, thereby disguising the fact that women, until very recently have been ignored." Joan M. Ringelheim,
THE ETHICAL AND THE UNSPEAKABLE: WOMEN AND THE HOLOCAUST 1 (1993). The first conference on
women and the Holocaust took place in March 1983 at Stem College. See WOMEN SURVIVING: THE
HOLOCAUST - PROCEEDING OF THE CONFERENCE (Esther Katz & Joan Miriam Ringelheim eds., 1983).
I1. Some historical accounts in tandem with individual narratives suggest that women encountered
more difficult conditions than men. See, e.g., RUBEN AINSZTEIN, JEWISH RESISTANCE IN NAZI-OCCUPIED
EUROPE: WITH A HISTORICAL SURVEY OF THE JEW AS FIGHTER AND SOLDIER IN DIASPORA 788-89 (1974);
CHARLOTTE DELBO, NONE OF US WILL RETURN (1968).
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By its very nature, when it comes to describing reality, art always
demands a certain intensification, for many and various reasons.
However, that is not the case with the Holocaust. Everything in it
already seems so thoroughly unreal, as if it no longer belonged to the
experience of our generation, but to mythology. Thence comes the
need to bring it down to the human realm. This is not a mechanical
problem, but an essential one. When I say, "to bring it down," I do not
mean to simplify, to attenuate, or even to sweeten the horror, but to
attempt to make the events speak through the individual and in his
language, to rescue the suffering from huge numbers, from dreadful
anonymity, and to restore the person's given and family name, to give
the tortured person back his human form, which was snatched away
from him.12
It is not only the scale and distance of the primary research sources that
poses the challenge of extreme encounter for the academic, but also the nature
of the sources themselves. As Laurence Langer, one of the foremost
researchers on narrative and the Holocaust documents argues, the expression
of what happened may be simultaneously fragmented, disrupted, and engaged
in a constant inner struggle to do justice to the wholeness of the experience
and its fit with the present of survival. 13 As such, narratives are intricate
presentations of filtered memories providing complex clues to the nature the
Holocaust experience.
In this intellectual encounter, one must also be willing to abandon
comfortable ethical ideals and accept that they may not "fit" the world of
Holocaust experience. The encounter with Holocaust narrative may result in a
desire to wrap the horrific in a cloak of therapeutic closure, redemption, and
heroic survival. To do so gives meaning to the analyst but not the storyteller,
who more often than not is saying that none of those psychological
mechanisms have meaning in the world she inhabits. As legal scholars, we
must correspondingly remain wary of the temptation to liberate the narrative
by offering "made to measure" definitions and thereafter sanctions as full
solutions to the harms experienced.
For lawyers, any contemporary research of the wartime period comes with
the legal vocabulary of the late twentieth century. International law now
articulates in law and politics a terminology for sexual violation. We use the
words rape, sexual assault, prostitution, and sexual violation with the sense of
a distinct reference model within which the acts are understood and the harms
take place. Self-evidently, this reference model was not in place either during
or immediately following the Second World War. This is not the vocabulary of
women describing the violence done to themselves or others. To make sense
12. LAURENCE L. LANGER, HOLOCAUST TESTIMONIES: THE RUINS OF MEMORY i (1980) (quoting
Appelfeld).
13. See id. at ix-xvii.
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of women's description of what happened to them (as women) during the
Holocaust we must discard the perceived totality and completeness of the
vocabulary we bring with us. Our vocabulary of violation is in large part the
product of the post-war international legal regime reacting to its antecedent
history. As Lawrence Langer forcibly recognizes when reflecting on the
inadequacy of language to confront the dilemma of choice in the Holocaust
period: "The real challenge before us is to invent a vocabulary of annihilation
appropriate to the deathcamp experience; in its absence, we should at least be
prepared to redefine the terminology of transcendence-'dignity', 'choice',
'suffering' and 'spirit'.....
The same challenge is presented to legal vocabulary of violation. Our
vocabulary may be excess intellectual baggage preventing the observer from
fully understanding the voices of the women who articulate their stories of
survival and victimization. So, the first caution for the reader and the writer
alike lies in pinning our understanding of the period on the chassis of existing
linguistic categorizations.
What I hope to demonstrate is that the post-war terrain of understanding
does not sufficiently describe the complexity or the reception of dehumanizing
acts perpetrated upon women during the wartime period. The
inappropriateness of legal definitions does not lie solely in the fact that the
women who reported sexual crimes did so in a world which failed to
categorize their experiences as crimes, but that post-war legal terminology is
inadequate to describe some of their experiences. Thus, if the legal language
given birth to by the Holocaust experience was inadequate then, it may also
have served since to perpetuate the exclusion of certain violations from the
arena of legal accountability altogether. In acknowledging the limits of
existing legal frameworks and descriptive terms we may then try to augment
our conceptual analysis to assess both the kinds of "harms" experienced and
the ability of legal mechanisms to assure accountability for their perpetration.
In many domestic legal systems the inadequacy of legal language to
confront and sanction the myriad practices forced upon the female person
during acts of sexual violation has been acknowledged. 15 Contemporary legal
writing in the liberal vein acknowledges the veracity of some feminist claims
on the structural limits of sanctions against male sexual violence, and goes
some way towards agitating positively for reform. 16 Thus, as some domestic
14. See Lawrence L. Langer, The Dilemma of Choice in the Death Camps, in 4 CENTERPOINT: THE
HOLOCAUST 54, 58 (1980)
15. For example, in the United States many states have considered or passed some form of rape reform
legislation. See Leigh Bienen, Rape III - National Developments in Rape Reform Legislation, 6 WOMEN'S
RTS. L. REP. 170, 171 (1980).
16. In a provocative argument, Donald Dripps claims that to confront the problems of existing
sanctions of rape in the United States, legal standards ought to conceive of sex as a commodity and rape as a
theft of that commodity. See Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the
Presence of Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1780, 1786 (1992). Richard Posner for
example, has advocated such reforms as the criminalization of marital rape. See RiCHARD POSNER, SEX AND
REASON 383-95 (1992). However, Posner also maintains a strong defense of much consensual sexual
behavior that many feminists claim to be subordinating. This is also true of Duncan Kennedy, who explains
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legal systems seek more sophisticated modalities of sanction and expression
for the experiences of sexual violence, contemporary international law is not
without resources or inspiration. The evolving standards in international law
do not necessarily start from a blank canvas. An increasing number of
progressive articulations define and remedy sex-based violence in expansive
and imaginative ways. But there is the persistent tendency for the reform
debate to be overshadowed by a limited vision of both the experience of
violence itself and the possibilities of law to sanctioning in a holistic way.
International law and the states who beget it, have some way to go in
overcoming the ingrained inhibitions and biases that marginalize the
regulation of women's experiences in the context of armed conflict.
II. THE EXPERIENCE OF VIOLENCE DURING THE HOLOCAUST
Any attempt to document in a cursory manner the experience of Holocaust
violence does little service to either the victims themselves or to the process of
ascribing legal culpability. Hence what I seek to illustrate is limited. First, I
aim to give an account of the lack of knowledge available about the unique
experiences of gendered violence during the period. Second, I aim to outline
the singular nature of sexual violation during the Holocaust.
Most individual female accounts forming the basis for this study do not at
initial reading, sufficiently provide information about and detail to a gendered
account of victimization.17 Rather, the gender of the victim weaves into the
narrative in ways that belie our categorization of both harms experienced and
gender itself. Accounts of victimization are remarkable for their emphasis on
the other and not the self. The other is both immediate family and community,
but also (and particularly within the camp experiences) other women with
whom the victims formed substitute families within the brutality of the Nazi
regime. Throughout individual accounts there is a consistent emphasis on the
deprivation of food and sanitary facilities. Striking in individual testimonies is
the shame associated with hunger and the search for sustenance, and the will
to continue to do so when all other vestiges of human dignity have been
removed. Also conspicuous is the extent to which women themselves
minimize the specifically female aspects of the Holocaust experience. One
survivor recollecting a series of acts of sexual molestation as a child in hiding
that all men benefit from rape, but constructs a strong defense of a broad range of consensual sexual
practices. See Duncan Kennedy, Sexual Abuse, Sexy Dressing and the Eroticization of Domination 26 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 1309 (1992).
17. See, e.g., JULTA BENDREMER, WOMEN SURVIVING THE HOLOCAUST (1997); ANNA EILENBERG,
SISTERS IN THE STORM (1993); PENNEY FRANCES, I WAS THERE (1989); GLAS-LARSSON, I WANT TO SPEAK
(1993); CECILE KLEIN, SENTENCED TO LIFE (1989); ROBIN RUTH LINDEN, MAKING STORIES, MAKING SELVES:
FEMINIST REFLECTIONS ON THE HOLOCAUST (1995); SHELLY LOVE, CRIMINAL EXPERIMENTS ON HUMAN
BEINGS IN AUSCHWITZ (1993); SONIA SCHREIBER, FACING HISTORY AND OURSELVES: I PROMISED I WOULD
TELL (1993); GERTY SPIES, MY YEARS IN THERESIENSTADT: HOW ONE WOMAN SURVIVED THE HOLOCAUST
(1997); FRANCES F. TRITT, HOLOCAUST DIARY (1982); RESKE WEISS, JOURNEY THROUGH HELL (1962);
CHAYA ZISKIND, THEY WATCHED OVER US. (1998).
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puts it this way:
In respect of what happened, [what we] suffered and saw-the
humiliation in the ghetto, seeing our relatives dying and taken away
[as well as] my friends,... then seeing the ghetto . . burn and seeing
people jumping out and burned-is this [molestation] important? It is
only important to me at the moment.'8
It is as if the stories tell us that at the narrow end of the dehumanizing
process, what is left is only the most basic instinct of the person-that of
physical survival. Endurance at its minimum is about sustenance and giving
the physical shell of the person the means to live one more day. In such
accounts, all other forms of brutality fade to secondary status. As long as there
is some food, perhaps some sleep, one may live; other humiliations may not
destroy you and in the story of survival they are lost or unaccounted for. In
part, the cumulative narrative emphasizes the fundamentals of survival, and
can detract emphasis from the explicit means undertaken to deprive women of
their humanity, as well as the gendered component of that process. It also
obscures the extent to which the targeting and humiliation of women was
purposeful and designed to achieve particular military and political goals. For
women, seeing what happened to family members and friends of both genders
may prevent them from singling out the unique aspects of their own treatment.
Up close it may all look the same. The function of the academic is to make
those critical distinctions and to offer a rationale that explains them. At this
point, I identify and discuss two kinds of the gendered experience of the
Second World Warl 9: first, the experiences of the ghettos and of civilians in
occupied territory; second, the experiences of women in concentration camps.
A. The Ghettos
Daily life in Nazi Germany and German occupied territories irrevocably
changed the lives of targeted groups and individuals. Throughout the 1930's,
ordinary life for many continued, but always with the ever-increasing
encroachment of the extra-ordinary. As Kaplan points out, "Lawlessness,
ostracism, and a loss of rights took their toll on Jews of all sexes and ages.
' 20
As a constitutional dictatorship solidified itself, daily equilibrium was lost.
Nowhere is this more true than in the ghetto experience. Despite the limited
availability of information pertaining to gendered experiences in the ghettos, I
18. See Ringelheim, supra note 8, at 343 (citing unnamed survivor's testimony).
19. It should be borne in mind that women were a majority of the Jewish population in German-
occupied Europe. In Poland in 1931 they constituted 52.08% of the Jewish population; in Byelorussia they
constituted 53.25% in 1939, and in Germany itself they were 52.24% of the population in 1933. See RAUL
HILBERG, PERPETRATORS, VICTIMS, BYSTANDERS: THE JEWISH CATASTROPHE 1933-1945 127 (1993).
20. See Marian Kaplan, Keeping Calm and Weathering the Storm Jewish Women's Responses to Daily
Life in Nazi Germany, 1933-1939 in WOMEN IN THE HOLOCAUST, supra note 7, at 39.
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can make some preliminary comments. For some families, only women,
children and the old were left together through the ghetto experience when the
male members of the family had departed from their homes assuming that
women and children would be safe from violation by the Nazis. 21 Thus,
anticipatory reaction to the Germans shielded some men, under the
assumption that women and children left behind would not be targeted.
Hence, the rounded-up population and the populations in the ghettos were
disproportionately female. In this context women largely took on the
distinctive burden of responsibility for children. They were subject to a brutal
regime of wanton cruelty. In addition, they lived with the continued
uncertainty of not knowing their ultimate fate. They were vulnerable to rape,
to murder of themselves and their children, to the necessity of killing their
own or other women's babies, to forced abortion and to a range of other forms
of sex-based violation.22
Some women in the ghettos continued to have familial male protection,
which limited to a degree their potential sexual vulnerability. Notwithstanding
this protection, there was the constant fear and lived experience of conditions
within the ghettos worsening for all. Survivors' stories of hiding in bunkers
while Nazis liquidated the ghettos and their populations are rife with the
enormous moral dilemmas which confronted them.23 Could children be
brought to the bunkers and saved, given the conditions of silence and stillness
required for extended periods which might jeopardize the lives of others?
Should families choose younger members over older kin if there was a
shortage of space in a hiding place? Should those to whom one had a
particular duty of care be shielded first, such as elderly or infirm parents?
Women in the ghettos were especially vulnerable because of traditional
attitudes towards them, their gender-defined conditions, and their unique
maternal responsibilities. The key to understanding the experience of women
in the ghettos and camps is to see maternity infected by atrocity, where the
established conventions of motherhood are deliberately ravaged and assaulted.
Placing women in the context of their maternal obligations is critical to
understanding the harms perpetrated upon them and the intentions of the
perpetrators in the ghetto context.
For Jewish women in the ghettos, there is clear evidence that their
vulnerability to sexual exploitation was limited by the laws preventing inter-
2 1. "Most Jews believed - at least in the beginning - that the Germans were 'civilized' and would
honor traditional gender norms and would not harm women and children. Because the Jews believed that
only men were in real danger, they responded with gender-specific plans to protect and save their men. Thus,
in formulating their strategies for migration, hiding, and escape, they typically decided that men should leave
first and have priority for exit visas." WEITZMAN & OFER, supra note 7, at 5.
22. Esther Kraine, born in Romania describes how in the Ghetto an order was given to collect all gold.
A Christian mid-wife was ordered to search the women's vaginas for hidden gold. She says "At that time, I
considered this action as an act of great violence against me." The procedure was performed on all the
women in the Ghetto. Testimony # 03/1007 Yad Vashem Holocaust Museum archives.
23. See generally MINA ROSNER, I AM A WITNESS (1994).
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racial relations.24 When those laws were violated by the Germans themselves,
there is consistent evidence in the survivors testimonies that women who had
been sexually violated were immediately murdered.25 There is also evidence
that in these circumstances non-attached women were prey to the Judenrat for
sexual favors, a means to survive in protection bought by sexual
exploitation. 26 It is important to note that this facet of female vulnerability
during times of exigency escapes accountability under the formal rubric of
international humanitarian law.27 Evidently the Judenrat in some ghettos took
administrative and social control of various aspects of women's lives. In some
ghettos this included the intimate regulation of women's reproductive capacity
and the fate of their newborn children. For example, in the Shavel ghetto, the
28Judenrat made and enforced a collective (male) decision to force abortion.
The consequences for women who refused abortions were both personal and
familial. The response to women who refused is described by Eisenberg as
follows:
Deprive them of food cards, transfer their working members to worse
jobs, deprive them of medical assistance, of firewood. If that doesn't
work, then the women must be called in and given an ultimatum-
either an abortion or the Committee will have to inform the security
police . . . . It was proposed that all physicians and midwives be
forbidden to assist during childbirth.29
It would be misleading to suggest that in all the diverse situations
concerning the fate of Jewish children, male leaders of the victim community
were indifferent to the fate of children (unborn or otherwise) and their
mothers. Once again it bears repeating-as we assess the actions of
24. For example, Bella Katz, born in Boutrad in 1920, reports her assessment of the threat posed to
Jewish women from German soldiers in particular: "German soldiers never raped Jewish women, I mean,
from the Germans we were never afraid to be sexually humiliated, because they never treated us like
objects.. .A German never lusted for a Jewish girl, because it was not allowed, he disgraced his race if he
went with a Jewish girl." Testimony #03/8196. Yad Vashem Holocaust Museum archives.
25. Sabina Lustig, born in Warsaw, describes her experiences of working at an ammunition factory in
Skarzysko-Kamienna during the war. Every Sunday night German officers came to the barracks and took
away women with them. The girls never came back because it was forbidden to have sex with a Jewish
woman. She says " We knew that they were killing them." Testimony # 03/8792 Yad Vashem Holocaust
Museum archives.
26. See Ringelheim, supra note 10, at 5 ( "In Poland, both in ghettos and camps, sexuality was a means
of buying protection from the Jewish policemen and others who had means and power.") (quoting Karmel).
27. Though outside the scope of discussion of this essay, violations perpetrated against civilians by
civilians pose particular difficulties of accountability in international humanitarian law, both then and now.
Fhe application of the laws of war suppose a situation of conflict where violence is perpetrated by one side
against the other. The entire discourse presumes a dichotomized dialectic. Civilians who take advantage of a
conflict situation to perpetrate crimes on fellow civilians generally fall outside the traditional categories of
sanction, unless they can be deemed agents for one side of the conflict in the acts they undertake.
28. See AZRIEL EISENBERG, WITNESS TO THE HOLOCAUST 153-54 (1981). Ringelheim has critized
Eisenberg's account of these events in the ghettos, particularly the title. "The Agony of the Judenrat of
Shavel: Murder of the Unborn." She argues that the title fails to recognize that the greater harm was caused
to the women who were forced to undergo abortions, not by the men who made the decision to force them to
do so. See Ringelheim, supra note 10, at 9.
29. EISENBERG, supra note 28, at 153-154.
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community leaders, "choice" in such a situation is a restricted and inadequate
concept. There is overwhelming evidence that children and their care
remained the special concern of community leaders, primarily because women
remained the biological guarantors of the community's future. 30 Nonetheless,
women were effectively excluded from such decision-making processes and
they bore the heaviest costs of decisions made in the area of reproduction and
parenting.
Numerous individual testimonies attest to extensive sexual assaults upon
women while they were being transported from ghettos to work and death
camps. 31 Thus, transfer between locations were a particular source of
vulnerability for women, presenting the possibility of group violation by
32numerous rather than individual men. There is extensive archival
information that suggests that such assaults were rife; the fact of their
occurrence was recorded in the immediate aftermath of the Holocaust by
survivors. It is also widely affirmed that following liberation, women
survivors remained exposed to sexual assaults by Allied soldiers. For
example, one survivor describes travelling on a train from Bratislava to
Budapest at the end of 1944, when a group of Russian soldiers entered the
train and commenced a series of sexual attacks on the women present, many
of whom were work camp survivors.33 She escaped by jumping out of the
moving train with two other women.
B. The Camps
The experiences in the camps are profoundly difficult to describe. The
extensive academic treatment of the subject does not require me to review the
scope and extremity of dehumanization experienced by both men and women.
What I wish to do is to concentrate on what knowledge there exists about
specifically sex-based violence suffered by women. On arrival to the
concentration camps, both men's and women's initial experience was
separation from their family groupings: men and boys from women and girls,
parents from children, and relatives from one another. Thereafter, all personal
effects were removed from individuals, both men and women. This included
30. Raul Hilberg, for example, points out that
"Jacob Gens in Vilnius would not surrender [children to the Nazi regime]. Wilhelm
Filderman in Romania wrote letters to save orphans languishing across the Dnestr River.
Raymond-Raoul Lambert, already awaiting his own deportation in an internment camp near
Paris, urged that children be scattered while there was still time. When Adam Czerniakow in
the Warsaw Ghetto could not obtain assurances from the German resettlement staff about the
ghetto orphans, he took a poison pill."
HILBERG, supra note 19, at 147.
3 1. See Archival testimonies, Agnes Horwatt, bom in Hungary; Lora Veron born in Rhodes Greece
Testimony # 03/10423 Yad Vashem archives.
32. Shoshana Roshcovsky, bom in Kavnik, gives an account of a transfer to Auschwitz in which a
group of Hungarian soldiers mass raped a group of Jewish women. Testimony # 03/7065 Yad Vashem
archives.
33. See Hedva Yerushalmi, bom in Sub-Carpatic Russia. Testimony # 03/8805 Yad Vashem archives.
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all baggage that came with the person, all personal clothing, jewelry, and
other individualized items such as spectacles. Now in a single-sex
environment, those women who were not immediately sent to the gas
chambers were forced to remove their clothing, their bodies subject to the
scrutiny and ridicule of the predominantly male camp guards and soldiers.
34
While forced nakedness was a common feature of the camp reception for both
sexes, women's testimonies are consistent in identifying the removal of
clothing not only as an act of gender-neutral humiliation, but as a form of
sexual abasement. This experience was due not only to the fact that the
onlookers were male and the subjects female, but equally to the internalization
of the act itself. That is, women seemed to understand that non-consensual
nudity was intended to harm them in a manner distinct from their male
counterparts' sense of harm and humiliation. After the removal of clothing,
women were shaved of all their bodily hair in a surgical fashion, part of the
internal public spectacle that accompanied the selection process within the
35camps. It is undisputed that at arrival, women with young children were
predominantly picked for extermination. Testimonies suggest that many
women, dimly aware of the fate ahead (and some being given a 'choice' to
abandon their children), nevertheless chose to remain with their offspring. A
woman's maternal status and a continued attachment to her children made her
uniquely assailable and defenseless. Maternity in many cases simply
constituted an unavoidable death sentence.
In certain death camps, medical experimentation carried out by the Nazi
regime specifically targeted pregnant women and women's reproductive
organs. 36 One woman survivor describes being pregnant and escaping
selection on numerous occasions by stealth until she was noticed by Doctor
Mengele. 37 He allowed her to give birth, but tied up her breasts after the
delivery of her child so that she was unable to feed her newborn. Rather than
34. One survivor, Reska Weiss, describes the process in her memoirs as follows:
Scarcely had we entered when there came a stentorian command for every body to strip to the
skin. In our terror and humiliation we undressed and looked for places to hang our clothes.
The S.S. men, noticing this shouted: 'Throw everything on the floor!' We obeyed, and stood
completely naked among the guffawing guards, who milled around us bellowing obscene
remarks. Never in our wildest dreams would we have imagined such degradation.
RESKA WEISS, JOURNEY THROUGH HELL 39 (1962).
35. Myra Goldenberg relates the story of four women survivors of Dachau: Again, the women were
forced to undress in front of the SS, and "completely naked ... were led to a different room, where female
barbers shaved their entire body." They were "disinfected with a rag soaked in kerosene, which heavily
irritated the freshly shaved skin. Finally, each was issued a "ragged dress without any regard paid to length
or size." Beaten by gypsy prisoners if they asked to exchange their dresses for better fitting garments, they
soon understood that the one rag they wore was their dress, underwear, towel, and handkerchief." Myma
Goldenberg, Testimony, Narrative, and Nightmare: The Experiences of Jewish Women in the Holocaust, in
ACTIVE VOICES: WOMEN IN JEWISH CULTURE 94, 96-97 (Maurie Sacks ed., (1997) (quoting MARTIN GILBERT,
THE HOLOCAUST 706-08 (1985)).
36. One survivor described the role of a Jewish female gynecologist, Gizela Perl, who was brought to
the infirmary at Auschwitz. She was asked to bring pregnant women to the infirmary on the promise of
additional food. The survivor, Lea Fridler, reported that Dr. Perl performed numerous abortions at night to
save them from experimentation and inevitable death in the gas chambers because they were carrying
children. All the abortions were performed without anesthetics. See Lea Fridler, Testimony # 03/10484 Yad
Vashem archives.
37. Ruth Aliaz, born in Ostrava Czechoslovakia, Testimony # 03/8940 Yad Vashem archives.
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watch the child starve to death she used morphine given to her by a Czech
woman working in the Auschwitz infirmary to kill her newborn baby.
Notably, sexual experimentation on women was the only specifically
gendered violation subjected to legal scrutiny during the Nuremberg Trials.
The so-called "Doctors Trial" tried twenty-three defendants. The following
experiments were examined as war crimes: high-altitude experiments,
freezing experiments, malaria experiments, mustard gas experiments,
sulfanilamide experiments, bone-muscle-nerve experiments and bone
transplantation experiments, sea-water experiments, epidemic jaundice
experiments, spotted fever experiments, experiments with poison, incendiary
bomb experiments, and sterilization experiments. 38 Evidence at the trials
demonstrated that thousands of victims, predominantly women, were subject
to sterilization procedures. The experiments were conducted by means of x-
ray, surgery and various drugs, primarily at Auschwitz, Ravensbruck and
other concentration camps, with the cogent aim of developing medical science
to plan and practice genocide.39
III. ACCOUNTING FOR HARMS
The above is an empirical description that approximates the lived
experience of both women who died and women who survived the camp
experience. The question I now address is the legality and sanctioning of these
experiences. In the terminology of law, we can state that these women were
subject to unlawful detention, that their civilian status was violated, that they
were subject to assaults on the person and even grievous bodily harm, and that
those who did not survive were murdered. Under the formal legal rubric of
modem humanitarian law, we ask whether the harms experienced are defined
as crimes by the Geneva Conventions of 1977 and the supplementary
Additional Protocols of 1977. In addition, following the jurisprudence of the
Nuremberg Trials, we can assess whether such acts constitute crimes against
humanity. 40 I suggest, however, that this legal catalogue of harm lacks
breadth, encompassing only a fraction of what women actually experienced as
sexual harm and which was intended as such by their captors.
38. See United States v. Karl Brandt, in I TRIALS OF THE WAR CRIMINALS (1949).
39. See id. at 48, 694-702.
40. Crimes against Humanity were defined in the Tribunal's Charter as:
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts committed against
any civilian population before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial and
religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where
perpetrated.
Nuremberg Charter Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, and the Charter of the Int'l Military Tribunal, 82 U.N.T.S. 280, entered into force Aug. 8,
1945.
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A. The Harm of Separation
A detailed analysis of all violations experienced by women during the
Holocaust is well beyond the scope of this article. Thus, I wish to focus on
two particular aspects of maltreatment, as a means of illustrating the broader
themes: 1) that law fails to identify certain acts perpetrated upon women
during war as harms and 2) that such acts are distinct, because not only are
they experienced by women rather than men, but they are encoded with
political/military purposes. First, I wish to explore the extent to which violent
acts aimed collectively at women and children, and more particularly at
women as mothers, can be defined and accounted for as explicitly sexual
harms. Thus, when a woman as mother is forcibly separated from her
dependant child, whose fate she cannot control and can only imagine as grim,
I would suggest that another quantifiable harm has been caused. I would also
suggest that the harm occurs in the realm of the sexual self-and not
exclusively in the realm of familial or non-gendered unencumbered self.
4 1
This harm of separation that I identify is linked to the broader jurisprudential
claim articulated so cogently by Robin West. She states:
Women are not essentially, necessarily, inevitably, invariably, always
and forever separate from other human beings: women, distinctively,
are quite clearly "connected" to another human life when pregnant...
• Indeed, perhaps the central insight of feminist theory of the last
decade has been that women are "essentially connected," not
"essentially separate," from the rest of human life, both materially,
through pregnancy, intercourse, and breast-feeding, and existentially,
through the moral and practical life.42
Defining harms that categorically or even partially place the women in a
maternal context is not without theoretical or practical complications.
Feminist theory continues to struggle with and to rally against the
essentializing of the female person to her unique biological capacities.
Proponents of dominance feminism have stressed the pervasiveness of
sexualized domination in many venues of women's lives-not least in their
reproductive lives-the actualization of which is shaped by patriarchal views
of a woman's appropriate social space, and thus her conception of herself.
43
41. The issue is all the more fraught when women had to make choices over which of their children
would survive or to kill a newborn child in order to ensure the survival of other adults or herself. These
choiceless choices are aptly summed up in one narrative of such acts: "rather that ... we at least save the
mothers (and kill the babies) . . . so, the Germans succeeded in making murderers of even us." OLGA
LENGYEL, FIVE CHIMNEYS: THE STORY OF AUSCHWITZ 99-100 (1947).
42. Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY READINGS IN LAW AND
GENDER 201, 202 (Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991).
43. For a critical assessment of both dominance feminism and its counter-critiques. See Kathy Abrams,
Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory 95 COLUM. LAW REV. 304 (1995). In this
context, I use Abrams' definition of dominance feminism which describes " . .. [t]hat strand of feminist
(legal) theory that locates gender oppression in the sexualized domination of women by men and the
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Some feminist theory remains profoundly ambivalent about the choices of
women to seek motherhood and to demand status for it. Thus, there is a
reluctant to recognize and legitimate the act of mothering itself. In identifying
a world where sexual coercion is an innate and pervasive element of societal
construction," the enterprise of mothering is neither neutral nor
unproblematic. Feminists who have campaigned for and won legal reforms in
"gender neutral" terms, viewing the only alternative to patriarchal
constructions of sexuality as the elimination of sexual difference-making
masculinity and femininity politically and legally irrelevant-would strongly
resist the re-incorporation of gender specificity in any form.45
Nonetheless, a vigorous counter-debate has emerged in the feminist
community aimed at the perceived totality of the dominance paradigm, which
discounted the possibility of effective resistance to coercion, minimized the
positive sexual construction of the female self, and obscured the possibility of
meaningful choice and control for women in shaping their own lives and
sexual identities.46 In this context, Spinak's observation is apt, "[t]he legal,
social and even biological definition of mother within the dominant culture
has become a subject of increasing complexity and importance. 47 This debate
remains live and unconcluded.
While there is certainly a greater acknowledgement that female sexuality
is highly complex and individuated, maternal choice and status remain hotly
contested ground. This remains true in large part because the status of mother
is bound up with the concept of family. As Martha Fineman's groundbreaking
work The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family and Other Twentieth Century
Tragedies points out,48 mothers are usually defined in terms of their (sexual)
relation to fathers. Thus, the rejection of patriarchal sexual pigeonholing
makes it difficult to agitate positively for positioning women in terms of a
sexual link with their children, when harm occurs to them as a result of or in
connection with that relationship, Furthermore, while Fineman's scholarship
has focused on the care aspect of child dependency which is potentially
gender neutral49, in practice most societies and cultures are far removed from
any such model. Many feminists remain wary of motherhood and the
implications of 'woman as mother' for the broader agenda of gender
eroticization of that domination through pornography and other elements of popular culture." Id. at 304.
44. See generally SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILLS: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975);
ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY, MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1981); CATHARINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979).
45. See, e.g., Wendy Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture Courts and
Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 175 passim (1982).
46. See, e.g., PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY (Carole S. Vance ed., 2d ed.
1992). As Vance argues: "Initially useful as an ideological interpretation, [the dominance view] now shares
the same undialectical and simplistic focus as [its patriarchal counterpart]. Women's actual sexual experience
is more complicated, more difficult to grasp, more unsettling .. ." Id. at 5-6.
47. Jane M. Spinak, Reflections on a Case (of Motherhood), 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1990, 2048 (1995).
48. See MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH
CENTURY TRAGEDIES 5-6 (1995).
49. See id.
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equality.
50
Further conceptual bars to elaborating upon the sexual connection between
mother and child relate to the extent to which the patriarchal family limits and
controls sexuality. As Slaugher notes;
The sexual activity and reproductive capacity of the mother are
constrained by the breadwinner's earning power. In many ways, the
public images of mothers also denies them their sexuality and
eroticism .... Rarely [are mothers] presented as real life women who
are both nourishing and sexual beings.
51
The woman as mother is sexless, and only deviant motherhood is
expressly connected with the woman as sexual being and thus is in need of
control and remaking. 52 Paradoxically, as woman's sexual identity is
invariably connected to maternal functionalism, whether she chooses to have
children or not, sexual identity is excluded from social identity as mother. All
of this means that casting a legal framework that links specific forms of sex-
based harm experienced by women in connection with their children, or their
capacity to have children, will encounter sites of resistance that may not be
immediately apparent at the outset.
In the realm of international law, the conversion is at a far more
embryonic stage than with its domestic counterparts. Here, the suggestion that
harms to the female person in the context of conflict should be viewed not
only through the prism of individual harm but also through an additional layer
of the maternal may raise other alarms. Not least of these is the fear that
gaining consensus for the naming of individual harms is at its gestation point,
a narrow ground that requires consolidation rather than expansion. A cautious
view would suggest that radical shaping of the concept of sexual harm itself,
would only marginalize the agenda of mainstreaming the feminist agenda in
international criminal law. International feminist scholars may be reluctant to
press such an expanded notion of sexual harm, being ambivalent about the
relationships between autonomy, the maternal, and harm itself.
B. Military Functionalism and Maternal Separation
In the context of the Holocaust, the destruction of culture and a people was
the primary function of the violence perpetrated on European Jewry.
Targeting the family, destroying the relationships of dependency and nurture,
50. See generally Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Case of Pregnancy, I BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1985) (arguing that sex differences should be ignored except during the time when the
female is actually pregnant).
51. M.M. Slaughter, Fantasies: Single Mothers and Welfare Reform, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 2156, 2158
(1995).
52. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood, I AM. U. J.
GENDER& L. 1, 12 (1993).
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was a logical means to carry out this act of cultural annihilation. Social
subsistence was at that time and remains a gendered institution at its core.
Women carry children, and they remain the primary caretakers of their
offspring until the child has reached adulthood. Mothering is a gendered
undertaking and is understood as such by those seeking to destroy the fabric
of social life in a community. Hence, the harm of separation must be
understood in the terms under which the perpetrator carried out the act and its
receipt by the victim. Both psychological studies and individual testimonies
demonstrate to us that women experience forced separation from their
children in profoundly different ways from men.53 Many women articulate
such separation as a physical assault on their own person, concentrated on
their own experienced sense of being female, and aimed at undermining their
sexual identity by taking away the expression of that reproductive self-the
child. There is an undisputed communication between the perpetrator and the
victim in this context. Both profoundly understand the nature of the harm that
is being caused by one and experienced by the other. There is no ambiguity
between them. Rather, any ambiguity lies outside, in the categorization and
naming of the deed rather than in its actual and understood context.
Does this harm have a name in international law? In the post-Holocaust
world of human rights and humanitarian law, there are some categories that
may fit. In the context of familial separation, the legal regime of human rights
specifically recognizes a right to family life.54 Some of the case law which has
emerged from the regional human rights systems is striking in its
determination to guard the right of family integrity and the centrality of due
process in any legal proceeding which would seek to deprive parents and their
children of one another's support. 55 The Laws of War also place a high
rhetorical premium on the protection of children and their caretakers. Both
regulatory mechanisms in this arena derive their protective scope from notions
of the value of family and parenting as separate social goods, tied to a
conception of the child's integrity being furthered by a cohesive family unit.
However, neither system nor, more crucially, the humanitarian law
prohibitions applied in war situations, recognizes any harm of separation that
is tied to a sexual harm experienced by the mother as a result of enforced
severing. In short, the act of separation itself is not viewed as a sex-based
harm. Nor is the act of separation identified as functioning to facilitate
53. An early starting point for the significance of connectedness in women's lives is found in Carol
Gilligan's work. According to Gilligan, women view themselves as fundamentally connected to, and not
separate from, the rest of life. Thus the "'moral imperative"' for women revolves around caring and
connection, and not, as for men, around rights and non-interference. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT
VOICE 6-8 (1982).
54. For example Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political states: "No one shall be
subject to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family , home or correspondence, nor to
unlawful attacks on his honor and reputation." See 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967).
55. See, e.g, Kroom v. The Netherlands, Eur. Ct. H. R., Judgement of the 27 October 1994, Marckx v.
Belgium, Y.B. Eur. Cony. H. R. (1975), Hoffman, Judgement of the 23 June 1993, W, B & R v. The United
Kingdom, Report of the 15 October, 1985.
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genocide, ethnic cleansing, or the destruction of social and cultural
communities.
Separation is a specific example of my earlier general contention that the
object of attack is the woman's body, both in its actual and symbolic
manifestations. It is a categorical assault on female sexuality because it targets
the product of that sexuality-the child. It also functions as symbolic
aggression to a broader ethnic or cultural group because as "carriers of the
nation," mother and child destruction marks out the realization of broader
military objectives, by destroying the future of a people and hence the people
themselves. If we are truly to "name" harms and to make those who perpetrate
them accountable, then it is imperative that we identify the intent that
underlies the action in the first place and factor it into the identification of the
harm itself, the sanction that applies to it, and the remedy that is offered to the
victim.
Why then, given the extensive evidence of separation during the
Holocaust, has the perpetration of such acts been deemed to fall outside the
scope of legal regulation, and more specifically, not considered to fall, as I
suggest, into the realm of sex-based harm? First, as I outline in detail above,
there is a general reluctance to fully engage with the contradictions and
complexities of the sexual dimensions of mothering. On the one hand, the act
of reproduction is infinitely sexual. On the other hand, there have been (with
good reason) ongoing critical assessments by feminists of the essentialism that
lies in reducing or linking the female person's value and status to the act of
reproduction. However, conversations concentrated upon the relationship
between greater gender equality and reproduction that insist on decoupling
sexuality and its offspring can serve to starve the conceptualization of legal
accountability for sexual harms associated with the status of mother in
situations of war.
If we accept that the sexual violation of women during war is intimately
linked with their reproductive capacity, we run up against an "is" and "ought"
discussion. The dilemma might be articulated as follows--do we accept that
reproduction and the child are linked by social and cultural practices as a
sexual link with the mother, thus potentially essentializing the female as
mother and carer? Or rather, should we dismiss these practices of culture and
focus instead on a desired situation in which the woman as mother is not self
or other identified in such a way? One dilemma for the jurist is whether legal
sanction should reflect the actuality of practices, but in identifying them as
harms, serve to bolster their embeddedness as social norm. Or should the legal
sanction conform to the ideal type unencumbered by social context that may
be correctly identified as unsophisticated? Some might argue that if I am
content to acquiesce in the linkage between sexuality and offspring, a greater
disservice is done to a broader project of equality. Let me suggest that this
need not be the case. At the core of my position is the belief that existing
prohibitions on enforced and non-consensual familial separation are
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insufficient to encompass any individual harm experienced by the mother. To
create totalizing theories of harm that fail to account for the specific and lived
experiences of the victim is to undertake what can only be described as
"incorporationism," shunning the concrete in pursuit of universal truth.56 This
is also to subvert feminist sensibilities to the methodology of dominant legal
discourse, the cost of which is counted beyond the realm of the conceptual.
57
In this context, we must be attuned to the tendency to allow the question of
equality to be defined in purely Anglo-American terms. By contrast, we turn
to the theoretical possibilities explored by continental feminists such as
Helena Cixous. Cixous writes about equality not in terms of uniformity but
rather in terms of difference.58 Her writing is a theoretical engagement with
the representation of difference as process, as structure, and as a constitututive
of social and sexual identities.59 In short, asserting that harm and sexual
identity as mother are linked invokes a complicated conversation in law and
theory that we should not seek to avoid.
At the core of my position is the belief that existing prohibitions on
enforced and non-consensual familial separation in war are insufficient to
encompass any individual harm experienced by the mother. Moreover, unless
international legal prohibitions engage with the totality of harm experienced
by the victim, prohibitions will remain sterile ground, lacking the depth of
confrontation with the experience of those violated to make meaningful any
form of accountability for sexual violations.
The example of maternal separation demonstrates to us that the vocabulary
of acts that constitute harms in the legal sense requires enlargement. The
experience of gendered violence during the Holocaust has components that do
not "fit" then or presently existing legal categories. As the female survivors
themselves relate, a variety of their experiences did not count as legal harms
then or now in international law-including separation from their children,
sexual obliteration, forms of assault on their person that do not reach the
required legal standard for rape, and until recently, rape and direct sexual
violation itself. It confirms that existing categories are limited and exclude
acts that are infinitely gendered and in need of a legal and definitional home.
It also raises profound questions about the post-war enterprise of naming
harms and the exclusion of gendered violations from the framework of
accountability.
C. The Harm of Sexual Erasure.
A second illustration of both the limits of legal accountability and the
56. See Scales, supra note 1, at 1383-84.
57. See Martha L. Fineman, Challenging Law, Establishing Differences: The Future of Feminist Legal
Scholarship, 42 FLA. L. REv. 25, 30 (1990).
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underlying intentions that provoke sexual violation deals with what I term
deliberate sexual erasure. As outlined above, one of the most acutely invasive
acts experienced by all women in the camps was that of forced nakedness in
during selection into the camp system. This was invariably accompanied by
the shaving of all hair from intimate parts of the body, often by male guards
(who were generally connected to the Nazi regime) to the amusement or
ridicule of other viewing soldiers. The forced removal of clothing and the
public viewing of the private physical self are inherently sexual acts. Their
intent was to demonstrate the woman's sexual vulnerability and, to her
community, the complete absence of guardianship for her honor. Moreover,
the particular act of removing bodily hair was a far more encoded
communication of control. It proclaimed a stripping of sexuality from the
female person. In short, it was a message of sexual obliteration.
Both men and women experienced together many of these dehumanizing
60acts. Viewing the experience through the prism of women's assigned social
and familiar roles in Europe of the 1930s and 40s, there can be no doubt that
there would have been no confusion between victim and perpetrator over the
content of the message.61 Taking away a woman's clothing and exposing her
person to the gaze of men with whom she had no familial or sexual
relationship was a crude and effective act of sexual violation. Nudity in a
public context was an abnormal and grotesque experience for these women,
and the perpetrators understood that it would be experienced as such by them.
Moreover, we should remember that many of these women were religiously
observant, which would have augmented the shame and humiliation of the
acts they experienced.62 Shaving women thus had a communicative value,
intimately tied to their sexual personality. Shaving these women was a sexual
defilement-but it was organically linked to the enterprise of cultural
eradication in which destruction of the carriers of the community was a central
plank of policy.
63
60. For example, for religious men, the shaving of facial hair was also encoded with a clear personal,
religious, and cultural message of obliteration, and no comparisons on comparative dehumanization are
appropriate. However, it remains important to assert that the shaving of female bodily hair was a
victimization that was predominantly sexual.
61. Furthermore, Nazi views on the role and status of women under the regime of National Socialism
were well defined. As Gisela Bock points out: " ... Nazi antifeminism tended to promote, protect, and even
finance women as childbearers, housewives and mothers." See Gisela Bock, Racism and Sexism in Nazi
Germany: Motherhood, Compulsory Sterilization, and the State 8 SIGNS 400, 402 (1983). Parallel to this, of
course, was the exclusion of certain women from bearing and rearing children, and all the attendant social
status and respect that accompanied that position. Thus, the treatment of women came out of a clearly
articulated policy which encouraged and elevated the exclusion of some women and not others from public
and social space. There can be little doubt that those undertaking the micro tasks understood the ideology.
62. Particularly in Eastern Europe where economic development was slower than in the West and
where there was disportionately great examination relative to population, religious observance was more
entrenched. As Hyman notes, "Although secularization touched a substantial minority of Eastern European
Jews by the beginning of the twentieth century, the institutions and leadership of traditional religious culture
remained relatively vigorous."" See Paula E. Hyman, Gender and the Jewish Family in Modern Europe, in
WOMEN IN THE HOLOCAUST 2, supra note 7, at 25.
63. The act of shaving facilitated visually what Anna Pawelczynska describes as: "Sexual distinctions.
were totally eliminated in camps; traces of these distinctions were reflected solely in the extra possibilities
for tormenting and humiliating the prisoners." ANNA PAWELCZNSKA, VALUES AND VIOLENCE IN AUSCHWITZ:
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Once the initial abominations had taken place the women who survived
were handed clothing, generally of inadequate and ill-fitting form. In such
shapeless and monochrome coverings, body and femininity were discarded
and displaced. Inadequate food and the complete absence of sustenance for
extended intervals meant that bodies became skeletal and dehumanized. Most
women in the camps ceased to menstruate. There was a general consensus
among women survivors that chemical substances were added to the meager
food rations to achieve this end, though doubtlessly the lack of food, excessive
hard labor and the horror of surrounding circumstances might also have been
causally responsible for collective amenorrhea. Thus, the camp experience
had an unparalleled impact on the physicality of its female victims. Survival
meant the erasure of many of the physical connections with one's own sense
of female sense. The female body was deliberately obscured through the
capillaries of refined social and sexual obliteration.
Sexual violence in war is not a translucent occurrence. It has highly
complex characteristics manifested in a variety of compelled social practices
forced by the combatant on the female subject. Some of these practices are
arguably heightened manifestations of a culturally rooted contempt for women
that is elevated in times of crisis. But to fully understand the manner in which
sexual violence is experienced we need to finely examine the variety of social
practices that come to the fore in times of conflict. To reduce examination of
these acts to a shallow litany of narrow deeds upon the physical person of the
woman impoverishes our understanding of the functionality and experience of
sexual violence during war for women. Moreover, to see these acts as separate
from the methods and means of warfare is to assume incorrectly that they are
ancillary to military objectives, not a central element of them.
The reflection of such limited thinking is to be found in the
conceptualization of acts that interfere with the woman's bodily integrity.
Both international human rights conventions and humanitarian law confirm, in
general and specific terms, rights to bodily integrity. 64 Currently, the legal
regime of humanitarian law prohibits certain specific sexual acts with criminal
sanction. They include rape, enforced prostitution, and acts preventing birth
with a social or cultural group. There is no dispute that the articulation of
these acts as crimes in the context of war is an immense leap of accountability
for violations committed against women during war. Nonetheless, there is a
danger that the focus on articulating a catalogue of acts may detract attention
from the myriad of ways sexual based violence manifests itself during
conflict. This subsequently creates an interpretative task, where one is forced
to ask whether a certain acts fits within the definition and if it does not, it is
A SOCILOGICAL ANALYSIS 53 (1980).
64. For example, Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights bars anyperson
from being subject "to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment." International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 7, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
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excluded as a harm, or its specifically sexual nature is unacknowledged.65
Thus, the shaving women's bodies is precisely illustrative of an invasive
sexual act, which (amongst others) has never been specifically defined as
constituting a sexual offence nor as falling within the understood class of
unacceptable sexual acts. More particularly, the catalogue violations
specifically excludes a concept of sexual erasure, where the violation
specifically aims at depriving a woman of her sexual identity. Such harms are
subterranean and currently invisible.
IV. THE LAWS OF WAR AND SEXUAL VIOLATION.
Clearly, during the Second World War the laws of war were ill-equipped
and ill-fitted to respond as a legal matter (leaving aside the question of will to
enforcement) to these forms of violation. They were simply not sufficiently
articulated by states as matters of legality and conformity between them. They
were, in short, invisible. Since then, the laws of war have been substantially
augmented with a heavy emphasis on civilian protection. But who is the
civilian and what harms are imagined as potentially befalling him? Two short
points will be elucidated here. First, that the actor as civilian is imagined
primarily as male and not female, despite the overwhelming evidence that by
and large the civilian causalities of war, displacement and conquest are
females and their dependent offspring. Second, despite the substantive recent
augmentation of humanitarian law in respect of sexual crimes through the
statutes and jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals for the
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 66 in tandem with progress towards the
creation of an International Criminal Court,67 the female focused history of the
laws of war has been predominantly focused on the pregnant woman and a
certain form of protection for the woman as mother. Despite recent
movement, accountability has a thin history, lacking depth and imagination on
the forms of violation that women experience even in these selected privileged
arenas.
There is no doubt that by the time the Second World War started there was
65. See generally Deborah Blatt, Recognizing Rape as Method of Torture, 19 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 821 (1992).
66. The Statute of the ICTY has gone some considerable means to ameliorate the status of crimes
committed against women during war. For example, Article 4 of the Statute concerning genocide reaffirms in
a concrete and meaningful fashion the relationship between violent sexual acts directed at the women of a
national, ethnic, racial or religious group and the destruction of that entity. Article 5 of the statute endorses
the position that rape constitutes a crime against humanity. This is the first primary recognition given to the
crime of rape by an international tribunal. What will be crucial here is as I have pointed out elsewhere, is
what practical definition is given to the crime of rape, which acts will be interpreted to constitute rape and
whether penetration alone be conclusive. See Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Radical Rules: The Effects of Evidential
and Procedural Rules on the Regulation of Sexual Slavery in War, 60 ALB. L. REv. 883, 891(1997).
67. Article 7(l)(g)(j), of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court explicitly defines "rape,
sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, and any other form of sexual
violence of comparable gravity", as both crimes against humanity and war crimes provided that these acts are
committed as part of a widespread attack directed against any civilian population. United Nations: Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999.
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a minimal rhetorical consensus between states on the principle that women
constituted a protected class of person during war, though the terminology of
protection was not utilized nor the extent of deference legally defined. This
was reflected in the humanitarian law prohibition contained in the Hague
Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague
Convention VI) which states in part: "Family honor and rights, the lives of
persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and practices
must be respected." The notion of family honor was indivisible from the
honor of the woman-one was indivisible from the other, a characterization
which still remains true in part today. Thus, the parturient relationship
between family, demos and the female body is more than simply metaphorical
but writ large on the laws of protection themselves.
Following the First World War there were embryonic attempts to develop
the laws of war further. In January 1919, the Preliminary Peace Conference of
Paris decided to create a Commission for the purpose of "inquiring into the
responsibilities relating to the war.",68 This Commission issued its report in
March 1919, confirming the widespread violations of rights of combatants and
civilians. 69 It further compiled a formal list of acts which constituted breaches
of the laws and customs of war. These explicitly included rape and the
abduction of girls and women for the purpose of enforced prostitution.
Interestingly, when the United Nations Commission for the Investigation of
War Crimes (1943) was formed, it adopted the list of war crimes enumerated
by the Paris Commission as its immediate and practical working basis. 70 It is
also noteworthy that between 1939 and 1943, statesmen and governments
aware of the nature and extent of the warfare being waged by Germany, issued
various public declarations enumerating the German actions as contrary to
accepted rules of warfare. While sexual violence is not a preoccupation of
such pronouncements, it was not entirely absent. For example, the infamous
Molotov Notes of November 1941, in which the Russian Commissar for
Foreign Affairs circulated a diplomatic note to all Governments with which
the U.S.S.R. had diplomatic ties outlining the extent of the atrocities
committed against Red Army soldiers.71 The Note also contained details of
attacks on female nurses and women medical assistants. A further diplomatic
note of January 1942 detailed the deliberate targeting of civilian populations
in the territories conquered by the German army. It included details of
widespread rape and the use of women as screens in front of advancing
68. THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES
COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR 32 (1948).
69. See COMMISSION ON THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE AUTHORS OF THE WAR AND ON ENFORCEMENT OF
PENALTIES, REPORT PRESENTED TO THE PRELIMINARY PEACE CONFERENCE (1919), reprinted in 14 AM. J.
INT'L L. 95 (1920).
70. THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, supra note 68, at 477.
71. The Molotov Notes on German Atrocities. Notes sent by V.M. Molotov, Peoples Commissar for
Foreign Affairs, to all Governments with which the U.S.S.R. has diplomatic relations. (H.M. Stationery
Office).
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72troops. Also during the wartime period some unofficial work was carried out
by academic bodies with a view to re-establishing the rule of law in Europe
after the war. Thus, for example, an influential conference was convened at
Cambridge in November 1941 to form a committee to augment the legal
understanding of war crimes and the kinds of courts which would adjudicate
their violation.73 A sub-committee of the Cambridge Conference examining
War Crimes drew up a substantive report dividing war crimes into three main
categories:
(2) Acts connected with warfare and contrary to the laws of war, e.g.
use of poison gas, attacks on hospital ships, etc.
(One) without authority, e.g. rape, murder, etc.
(Two) with the approval of or at the order of authority, e.g., mass
murder, murder of hostages, deportation, etc.
(3) Serious crimes committed against property
(One) without authority, e.g. looting
(Two) with the approval of or at the order of authority, e.g.
wanton destruction, plundering of art treasures, etc.
Clearly there were a host of official pronouncements, authoritative
Committees and unofficial bodies which failed to acknowledge on any level
the particularity of a female experience during the war. 74 Nonetheless the
foregoing should illustrate that by the end of the Second World War, there
was not a complete absence of legal vocabulary or political recognition with
which to confront and legally sanction the actions of soldiers and others which
infringed upon the sexual integrity of female civilians they encountered or
exercised control over.
Despite this, the post-war accountability mechanisms were remarkably
silent on the experiences of women during the war. At the Tokyo Trials,
75
evidence of 'violence against women' was considered as one of the factors to
support convictions of war criminals.76 Sexual violence against women was
not, however, considered in its own right nor tried as a separate offence. The
Nuremberg Trials did not examine any specific questions of gendered
violation, though the destruction of female reproductive capacity was
tangential to the trial of the offences related to medical experimentation as
outlined above. The Nuremberg Tribunal was a forum in which the
experiences of gendered and systematic violence, characterized by sexual
72. See id.
73. THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION ,supra note 68, at 95-99.
74. See, e.g., the Declarations of the Polish and Czech Governments November 1941; the Roosevelt-
Churchill Statements of 25th October 1941; the Inter-Allied Commission and the Declaration of St. James's
of 13th January 1942; See generally Collective Notes presented to the Governments of Great Britain, the
U.S.S.R. and the USA and relative correspondence.
75. The trials were based on the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19,
1946, amended Apr. 26, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589.
76. John Pritchard & Sonia M. Zaide, The Tokyo War Crimes Trials (1987) (judgment).
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indignity was not heard.77 This occurred notwithstanding the prevalent
knowledge of Nazi and Japanese practices of forced prostitution and rape
during the war. Thus, the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials followed an age old
pattern that silenced the experience of women in war and communicated that
sexual violence was not an aberration, but rather a vocabulary of
communication between combatants which was safe from external
examination. The sole exception in the culpability silence around sexual
violence was Control Council Law No. 10 promulgated in December 1945.
After the Second World War, recognizing the inadequacy of the existing
legal standards to confront and name the kinds of acts experienced by
civilians, states sought to categorize and regulate certain prohibitions on
behavior by combatants during war. These were to be embodied in the Geneva
Conventions of 1949. Despite the particularity of violence and violations
experienced by women in the war, there was little reflection of that
distinctiveness in the agreed treaty standards. Rape was included in the litany
of prohibited acts against civilians, but it did not fall into the category of
C 78'grave breach' under the Geneva Conventions themselves. Therefore it
remained a crime of lesser consequence, subject only to domestic jurisdiction
which did not trigger international penal consequences. At the time of
drafting, women's honor remained the primary focus of concern. 79 Thus, the
limited prohibition of rape was defined solely in terms of a breach of the
honor of the woman. By the time of the next significant revision of the Laws
of War thirty years later (the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva
Conventions) concern for the protection of women in war was still far from
center-stage.
A preoccupation with the fertile and expectant woman was the most
evident augmentation of interest to be seen at the 1977 Diplomatic Conference
which expanded the protections of the laws of war to enumerated internal
conflicts. Again, the Diplomatic conference gave little of its attention to the
physical violence experienced by women in war. Nonetheless, there was a
notable preoccupation with the woman as mother. The Conference
acknowledged that women because of their "special situation" had to be given
77. Article VI of the Nuremberg Charter could have provided the basis for legal sanction of sexual
crimes. Article VI (b) defines war crimes as including,'"violations of the laws or customs of war. Such
violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation .. "' Article VI(c) defines
crimes against humanity to include "'.... murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population."' Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment
of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 82
U.N.T.S. 280. Aug. 8, 1945.
78. See Oren Gross, The Grave Breaches System and the Armed Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia, 16
MICH. J. INT'L L. 783, 820 (1995) (noting that the crime of rape is not explicitly included in common
Articles 50/51/130/147 of the Conventions).
79. Article 27 states,:"Women shall be especially proteccted against any attack on their honour, in
particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault." Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 27, para 2, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S.
287. See generally YOUGINDRA KHUSHALANI, DIGNITY AND HONOUR OF WOMEN AS BASIC AND
FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS (1982).
[Vol. 12:43
Sexual Violence and the Holocuast
"special protection."80 Such women in a special situation were described as
those who, "were pregnant women, maternity cases and women who were in
charge of children of less than seven years of age or who accompanied
them., 81 Though the diplomatic conversation is limited, I submit that its
initiation sprung from an implicit recognition by state parties of the link
between maternity and the survival of the demos. War, by definition, threatens
the existence of the state. To protect the maternal is to protect the biological
survival of the body politic. The same inverted logic applies to the destruction
of the maternal.
In addition, the Conference had virtual consensus on the appropriate
manner to deal with pregnant women who were subject to the death penalty.
Mr. Felbar of the German Democratic Republic was not alone in advocating
that:
• ..for humanitarian reasons, the protection envisaged for pregnant
women should be extended to other categories of women. It had
therefore proposed that the death penalty should not be pronounced on
mothers of infants and on women or old persons responsible for their
care and that it should not be pronounced or carried out on pregnant
82women.
What is unique about this extended diplomatic conversation is that it
constitutes the sole lengthy contribution to the discussion of protecting women
from violence during warfare, at the most significant international conference
on the topic since the post-war Geneva Conventions of 1949. The sexual,
sexualized and sexually violated woman is missing entirely from this
conversation. The only passing reference that can be interpreted to cover her
absence is the opening statement which concluded that, "opinions were
divided regarding the special protection to be given to women in armed
conflicts."
83
The only movement that is notable in the final document in the article
concerned with 'measures in favor of women and children', is the inclusion of
the phrase 'special respect' for women rather than the term 'honor.' In
addition, under Article 75 of the Protocol I, rape is included under the general
heading of being a crime against 'dignity,' rather than a crime against
'honor.' 84 This article also recognized the particular experience of forced
prostitution by specifically including a prohibition for that act in the final
80. See Statement of Mr. Surbeck, ICRC introducing a text drafted by the Committee. para 55.
HOWARD S. LEVIE 4 PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS: PROTOCOL I TO THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS (1981)
86.
81. Id.
82. Id. at para 61.
83. Id. at para 57.
84. Article 75 (2)(B) reads: outrages against personal dignity, in particular humiliating and egrading
treatment, enforced prostitution and any other forms of indecent assault. See Doc CDDH/SR.43 and Annex.
See Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference. Vol VI (1978).
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agreed text.85 Protocol II, also agreed upon by the same Diplomatic
Conference, includes in its provision of Fundamental Guarantees a prohibition
on rape.86 By December 1992, the International Committee for the Red Cross,
in an aide-memoir, declared that the provisions of Article 147 on grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions included rape.87 In the past decade there
has been significant debate on the subject of the legal status of violence
against women during war, and more so as to the legal prohibitions for the
violation of rape. Some academic commentators, particularly Theodor Meron
argue that combatants have been technically prohibited by the laws of war
prior to the positivist enunciation of the Geneva Conventions and the
Additional Protocols from engaging in acts of rape. The Geneva Conventions
directly prohibit rape in the Fourth Convention, and Article 76(1) and 85 of
the First Additional Protocol contain the same repudiation. However, as noted
above, the prohibitions in the Geneva Conventions define rape as an offence
against honor rather than an offence of a distinctly violent and sexual nature.
Equally problematic was the low status of prohibitions for sexual violations
within the hierarchy of humanitarian law offences. In short, not only had all-
encompassing sexual crimes against women been excluded from legal
prohibition under the laws of war, but when they were included, they had been
facets of male status violation.
This commentary does not intend to suggest that there was no
advancement in international treaty law from 1945 onwards in relation to the
recognition of female dignity as a separate category of protection. From the
end of the war, a proliferation of documentation and structures emerged from
the United Nations concerning themselves with the status and regulation of
women's lives. These included the UN Commission on the Status of
Women,88 the Convention on the Political Rights of Women, 89 the Convention
on Consent to Marriage, 90 and the Convention on the Nationality of Married
Women. 9 1 By 1975, the United Nations had united these principles into one
single document, the non-binding Declaration on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women.92 By 1980, in the middle of the UN Decade
for Women, the Declaration was redrafted and accepted as a multilateral
treaty, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
85. See Article 76, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August, 1949, and Relating to
the Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
86. See Article 4(2) (e), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August, 1949, and
Relating to the Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 609.
87. See ICRC, Aide-Memoire of December 3, 1992.
88. Created in 1947, promised international commitment to women's rights. For a detailed account of
the Commission's creation, see UNITED NATIONS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN:
1945-95 (1995).
89. Convention on the Political Rights of Women, March 31, 1953, 27 U.S.T. 1909, 193 U.N.T.S. 135.
90. Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages,
Dec. 10, 1962, 521 U.N.T.S. 231.
91. Convention On the Nationality of Married Women, Feb 20, 1957, 309 U.N.T.S. 65.
92. G.A. Res. 2263, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp (No.16) at 35, U.N. Doc A/6880 (1967).
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Against Women. 93 This flurry of paper might suggest a new centrality for
women in international human rights discourse. There can be no doubt that the
crystalization of these standards was of tremendous significance in giving a
language to the experiences of rights denial for women premised on their
gender. However, the continued marginalization of gender in the international
legal order and the inherent limitations of the documents themselves meant
that the gap between the rhetoric of equality and the reality of inequity for
women was stark and unchanging.
94
In the area of sexual based violence and women's experiences of war, this
gap was seismic. Most importantly, the lack of comprehensive legal sanction
for sex-based violence during war remained almost entirely ignored. The
conflict that forced the attention of the Western World on the lacunae was the
Balkan war of the early 1990's that occurred in the wake of the disintegration
of the Yugoslav state. Reports of systematic rape emerged from the Former
Yugoslavia beginning in the early spring of 1992.95 It became clear that the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and its
sister tribunal, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),
established to prosecute war crimes committed during the Rwandan civil war,
would have to go further than creatively interpreting existing standards of
humanitarian law such as the 'grave breaches' prohibitions. 'Reading-in'
sexual violence as a form of torture, assault or breach was insufficient.96 The
ICTY and ICTR were being called upon to move beyond subsuming female
centered violence into existing categories; such violence had to be
acknowledged and articulated in its own right.
Some of the jurisprudence emanating from the two courts in the realm of
sexual violence has been encouraging. For example, a recent decision from
the ICTR inter alia dealt with the particular practice of forced nudity in the
broader context of sexual violence. 97 The Prosecutor's indictment against
Jean-Paul Akayesu was amended in June 1997 to include charges of sexual
violence. 98 The indictment specified that acts of sexual violence included
93. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979,
G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR 34th Sess., Supp No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/34/36 (1980) (entered into force Sept.
3, 1981) reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980).
94. See Renee Holt, Women 's Rights and International Law: The Struggle for Recognition and
Enforcement I COLUM. J. GENDER & LAW 117, 132-41 (1991).
95. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the Special Rapporteur to the Commission on Human Rights compiled 12
reports on the atrocities committed in the Former Yugoslavia. His fifth report stated: Rape is an act whereby
the rapist, using force and compulsion, seeks to humiliate, dishonor, vilify and terrify the victim. In all his
reports, the special Rapporteur highlighted the diversity of the methods used to achieve ethnic cleansing.
Rape is one of these methods, as was said at the beginning. In this context, rape is not only a crime
committed against the person of the victim, it also aims to humiliate, dishonor, vilify the whole group.
Reliable information has reported instances of public rape, for example in front of a whole village, to
terrorise the population and force ethnic groups to flee. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/50 p.19
96. Other international courts have adopted this "read-in" approach to facilitate the consideration of
rape as a particularly serious violation of human rights. See, e.g., Aydin v. Turkey, 25 EUR. HUM. RTS. REP.
251 (1998) (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1997).
97. See Resolution Establishing the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR,
49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598 (1994).
98. See Kelly D. Askin, Sexual Violence in Decisions and Indictments of the Yugoslav and Rwandan
Tribunals: Current Status 93 Am. J. Int'l L. 97, 105-06 (1999).
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"forcible sexual penetration of the vagina, anus or other oral cavity by a penis
and/or of the vagina or anus by some other object, and sexual abuse such as
forced nudity. " Further, the evidence of witnesses during this trial is notable
in that women's testimony of what happened to them attested both to the harm
of forced nudity to them as well as of direct acts of sexual violence to their
persons. 99 The indictment marks a notable progress in the international
prosecution of gendered crimes because it confirms that sexual harm need not
solely result from physical violence or direct assault, but is far more pervasive
in form. The final judgment by the trial chamber is equally significant in its
broad and progressive definition of both rape and sexual violence.1
00
What is also unique about the Akayesu decisionis the link established
between systematic acts of sexual violation and the practice of genocide.
Akayesu was the first international war crimes trial to try and convict a
defendant of the crime of genocide. The trial chamber concluded that the
sexual violence committed by Akayesu's subordinates was an integral part of
the genocide committed in Rwanda. The linkage between the crime of
genocide and the pattern of the conflict in relation to rape acts is critical. The
trial chamber found that:
[Rape crimes] constitute genocide in the same way as any other act as
long as they were committed with the specific intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a particular group, targeted as such. Indeed, rape and
sexual violence certainly constitute . . . one of the worst ways of
inflict[ing] harm on the victim as he or she suffers both bodily and
mental harm .... Sexual violence was an integral part of the process
of destruction, specifically targeting Tutsi women and specifically
contributing to their destruction and to the destruction of the Tutsi
group as a whole. 101
Some feminist commentary has been highly critical of the linkage made
between sexual violence and communal destruction. 102 Hilary Charlsworth
argues, "This comment [cited above] suggests that the primary problem with
rape is either its effect on the ethnic identity of the child born as a result of the
rape or the demoralizing effect on the group as a whole."'0 3 While over-
emphasis on the the harm caused to the group may detract attention from the
damage to the victim, I do not accept that simultaneous recognition of both
constitutes a zero sum gain for women or for international law. Harms caused
99. See id. at 106-07 (citing JJ, a thirty-five year old Tutsi woman, who testified about "collective
rapes" and forced nudity of women and young girls while being held in confinement by Akayesu and others
under his command).
100. See generally William A. Schabas, L'Affaire Akayesu et ses Enseignements sur le Droit du
Genocide, 12 COLLECTION DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 111 (1999)
101. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akavesu, ICTR-96-4-T (September 2, 1998).
102. See Hilary Charlsworth, Feminist Methods in International Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L. L. 397, 386-389
(1999).
103. Id. at 387.
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by acts of violence in war can be bidirectional and multiple. Systematic rape
aimed at the destruction of individuals as well as their cultural communities is
Janus-faced. Not to acknowledge its multiple identities and its dual
functionality is to divest the accountability process of depth in adressing the
intention of the perpetrator and the actual experience of the subject of
violation.
Despite this recent progress there remain tremendous gaps in our
understanding of the lived actuality of sexual violence during war. Historical
examination of the formative period of international legal norms has much to
teach us of what has been missed by observers, jurists and prosecutors. A
deeper understanding of this "thicker" history is a means to allow for
development of more sophisticated legal mechanisms of accountability.
Elaborate and nuanced legality lies within the international community's
grasp in this arena. However, it can only be realized by a willingness to
acknowledge the structural deficiencies of existing norms. That is to say, in
articulating new or more detailed existing norms the international community
must be prepared to say that its understanding of sexual violation may not
have been deep enough, or premised on notions of the female self that have
little to do with how women actually experience and understand harms done
to them.
V. DEFINING SEXUAL HARMS WITHIN THE HUMAN RIGHTS PARADIGM
A reappraisal of the function and reception of sexual violence during the
Second World War in general and the Holocaust in particular leads to an
inescapable reevaluation of the framework of rights in the post-war terrain.
Why should this be the case? The answer requires a critical look at the
propulsion to create a post-war world in which the dignity of the individual
person had a meaning in law and morality that was beyond question. The key
to understanding the critique that I wish to advance here lies in
comprehending that at the core of the international post-war legal structure
was a new-found place for the individual. Thus, the post-war world has rightly
been called the Age of Rights, in which a seismic tremor repositioned the
individual in relation to the state, and metamorphosed the relationships of
states with one another. I will not quarrel with or underestimate the overall
value of this realignment in advancing the general protection of both men and
women from harms committed in peacetime and times of crisis. However, in
tandem with a number of other commentators I question the gendered
alignment of the individual who is at the core of this repositioning. The
construction, neutralization and exclusion of gender is inseparably intertwined
with the development of a new legal and political language of rights in the
post-war world.
Indisputably the legal transformation of individual status in international
law was the direct result of the catastrophic experiences of the war.
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The narrative of atrocity prompted the creation of supranational structures of
protection. However, the narrative of atrocity has not always been complete.
Nor has it encompassed the distinctive forms of inhumanity directed at
women and the modalities of that barbarity. There is a much "thicker" history
of the social, symbolic and functional aspects of gendered violence during the
Second World War than is generally acknowledged. Not only is it
underestimated in historical reckoning, but the laws and structures which seek
to prevent its reoccurrence are crafted without fully absorbing what an
unfreezing of the historical legacy might actually mean. The war's catalogue
of atrocity has resulted in a long half-century conversation between and about
states and citizens. 1°4 As I have suggested above, that conversation needs
widening and its conclusions need reworking in light of appreciating that the
authorized narratives do not say it all.
The post World War international legal community harnessed a
framework and language of individual rights as means of deterrence for acts
which violated the inherent dignity of the human person. However, as Martin
Scheinin points out, "[t]here are two unfounded presumptions that appear to
create obstacles for understanding and analyzing the operation of human
rights law."'10 5 The first is the presumption that the concept of a right equates
to a specific provision of an internationally agreed upon treaty between states,
thus assuming that a right is a single monolithic entity rather than a bundle of
intersecting entitlements covered by a single legal term. Second, that rights in
general and human rights in particular are thought of as bilateral relationships,
the symmetrical relationship logically existing between the state and the
individual. Both these presumptions require greater critical assessment in
order to demonstrate that it is possible, and in certain circumstances
preferable, to conceptualize the notion of a "right" as a shared privilege
between persons rather than as a chain of separate entitlement between
distinct individuals and the state. From this follows the supposition that a
violation of the right of one person can cause the deprivation of the same
entitlement for others, because the entitlement is a communal one. This
rethinking is critical to understanding the model of harm explored in this
essay.
A. Individual Rights and Sexual Violation
In the post-war world of international human rights law, I suggest that our
limited legal conceptualization of sex-based violence is partly located in the
manner in which rights entitlement has been constructed. I submit that the
104. 1 note my reliance here on the conceptual work of John and Jean Comaroff in their reconstruction
of the long conversations resulting from the South African colonial encounter. See generally JOHN & JEAN
COMAROFF, II, OF REVELATION AND REVOLUTION, THE DIALECTICS OF MODERNITY ON A SOUTH AFRICAN
FRONTIER (1997).
105. Martin Scheinin, Sexual Rights as Human Rights - Protected under Existing Human Rights
Treaties, 67 NORDIC J. OF INT'L LAW 17, 19 (1998).
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concept of a right as a monolithic entity, derived solely from the fallacy of a
smart linguistic interpretation upon which there is cohesive interpretative
consensus manifests a barren misconception of the content of entitlement.
10 6
Again as Scheinin points out, this approach assumes incorrectly "that what a
human right is about is one single monolithic entity, possibly complicated in
structure and grammar if spelled out in full. ' 10 7 This presumption also has a
Hartian quality, suggesting that analytic methodology harnessed to shared
historical conceptions of the functionality of a right will inevitably lead to
core meanings and result in equal protection for all across gendered lines. If
anything, the experience of gendered violence tells us that what law may
define as a harm subject to sanction is not necessarily or exclusively what the
recipient of the harm may understand the harm to herself to be. Moreover,
given the lack of concentration and interpretative energy historically expended
on conceptualizing what kinds of indignities women experience during
conflict, frequently what the law defines as harm is shallow in substance and
imagination. Thus, for example, as we survey the jurisprudence emanating
from the protected right to bodily integrity, we note that it has generally
excluded female experiences of physical violation, deeming them outside the
core of its interpretative consensus.108
A specific and recent example of both the advances in protection for
women from the judicial mechanisms of international human rights and the
limits of formal definition comes in the guise of a recent decision from the
European Court of Human Rights, concerning the sexual violation of a young
Kurdish woman, considered under Article 3 of the Convention. 109 For the first
time the Court of Human Rights categorically defined the act of rape as a
violation of the European Human Rights Convention's prohibition on torture.
However, closer inspection of this progressive decision also reveals its
limitations. Here the applicant, a seventeen-year-old Kurdish woman in
Turkish police custody, was subject to the following litany of abuse: "[s]he
was stripped naked, beaten, slapped, threatened and abused verbally. She was
forced into a tyre, spun around and hosed with ice-cold water from high-
pressure jets." 110 She was also raped while in custody. 111 The European Court
was satisfied that the factual evidence of harm was proven and that the charge
of rape was sustained, giving rise to a violation of Article 3 of the European
Convention by the state of Turkey. The Court's approach on the issue of rape
was highly progressive acknowledging both the physical and psychological
106. See generally CHARLES BLATTBERG, FROM PLURALIST TO PATRIOTIC POLITICS (1999) (Chapter 7,
articulating the generally distortive nature of rights conversation).
107. Id. at 19.
108. For example, it has not been until recently that a growing consensus has emerged from
international human rights enforcement mechanisms that rape can constitute a form of torture. Thus, only in
1992 did the Special Rapporteur on Torture clearly defined rape as torture. E/CN.4/1992/SR.21 (Summary
Record of the 21 st Meeting, February-March 1992).
109. See Aydin v. Turkey, 25 EUR. HUM. RTS. REP. 251 (1998) (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1997).
110. Id. at para. 75.
111. See id. at para. 78.
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scars attending the experience of violent sexual assault. 112
Limitations arise in connection with the litany of other acts perpetrated
upon the victim. There can be no dispute that enforced nakedness, lewd verbal
assaults, and touching of both intimate and other parts of the body are carried
out with the intent of sexual debasement. Their function is to communicate
sexual exposure. The harm experienced by the victim is in the realm of her
sexual identity and self-worth. This is where human rights linguistics fall
short. The formal apparatus of a single right, for example to be free from
inhuman and degrading treatment, lacks a depth of capacity to mold itself to
the lived experience of the victim. The "peripheral" harms associated with
rape, an act that has legal sanction associated with it, may in fact be equally
(and sometimes more) harmful to the victim than the centrally sanctioned act.
As the extensive discussion of the experience of women during the Holocaust
period reveals, many of the acts which were both intended and understood as
sexual harms were not then and are not now defined as such. So perhaps we
need to look more starkly at the taut link between rights and a narrow concept
of harm in the context of those acts which violate sexual integrity. In short,
harms are longer and "thicker" than we admit, with definable results when
they are not processed as such. Moreover, formal definitions of rights may not
correspond to the actuality of "harms" experienced.
B. The Limits of Autonomy in Accounting for Harms.
I also wish to question the assumed primacy of autonomy which underpins
the post-war liberal idea of human rights. This primacy has a particular effect
on the way in which we construct the idea of violation, and most particularly
the subject of violation. As Anthony Appiah notes, "Liberalism values
political liberty and freedom from government intervention in our lives,
because it holds that each person has the right to construct a life of her
own."' 113 In this way, modem conceptions of human rights predominantly
construct rights as entitlements against states. It is the autonomous rational
self that holds and asserts the entitlement, and who has ownership of it. 114 It is
not a shared entitlement and it is only communal in the sense that societies
composed of numerous individuals with their own unique entitlements
112. See id. at para. 83. The Court states:
Rape of a detainee by an official of the state must be considered to be an especially grave and
abhorrent form of ill treatment given the ease with which the offender can exploit the vulnerability
and weakened resistance of his victim. Furthermore, rape leaves deep psychological scars on the
victim which do not respond to the passage of time as quickly as other forms of physical and
mental violence. The applicant also experienced the acute physical pain of forced penetration,
which must have left her feeling debased and violated both physically and emotionally.
Id.
113. K. Anthony Appiah, Human Rights and Cosmopolitan Liberalism, in HUMAN RIGHTS AT
HARVARD, INTERDISCIPLINARY FACULTY PERSPECTIVES ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT 10 (1995).
114. One caveat on this principle that the enforcement mechanisms of modem international human
rights law developed is where the person holding the entitlement has been killed or is unable to exercise the
activation of sanction for the loss of rights, a family member or attached "other" may do so on her behalf.
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compose communities of mass rights. But the autonomous self remains a
human self, a creature of community and sociality. Again to Appiah:
We are social in many ways, and for many reasons. We are social,
first, because we are incapable of developing on our own; because we
need human nurturing, moral and intellectual education, and practice
with language if we are to develop into full autonomous persons. So
there is a sociality of mutual dependence. We are social, second,
because we humans naturally desire relationships with others-friends,
lovers, parents, children, the wider family, colleagues, neighbors-so
that sociality is for us an end that we desire for itself. We are social,
third, because many others things we value, such as literature and the
arts, culture, education, money, food and housing, depend essentially
on society for their production. Thus, we have an instrumental interest
in sociality.
115
How, if at all, does the modem language of human rights translate to the
human reality of sociality? Why do I argue that it is important that it do so?
Just as the human self is "dialogically constructed", I suggest that the
formal legal entitlements which acknowledge human dignity are "dialogically
constructed." As Charles Taylor has so aptly noted, the essential relation
between self and self-interpretation is gained through the relation between
selves and other selves. Thus he says:
This is the sense in which one cannot be a self on one's own. I am a
self only in relation to certain interlocutors: in one way in relation to
those conversation partners who were essential to my achieving self-
definition; in another in relation to those who are now crucial to my
continuing grasp of languages of self-understanding-and, of course,
these classes may overlap. A self exists only within what I call "webs
of interlocution.""
' 6
We gain conceptions of self through the other, and equally, our
conceptions of entitlement (and thus self-worth) are made meaningful by the
realization that the "others" with whom we are intimately and socially
connected have equal entitlements. When the human rights of an autonomous
individual are violated, such actions do not happen in isolation nor without
effect on others. Violations not only destabilize the person(s) toward whom
the acts are directly intended but a wider circle whose own autonomous
entitlements are precariously in balance with the well-being and safety of
others. Violation of X's right is not a free-standing singular act. It is a primary
act from which there may be numerous secondary violations. This may be
115. Appiah, supra note 113, at 11.
116. See CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF 36 (1990).
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described as the domino effect of rights violation, and it should lead us to
assess critically where the site of legal entitlement is located.
C. The Communities of Harm
I am particularly concerned with investigating the extent to which the
harms to women committed in situations of armed conflict created a broader
community of suffering: children, parents, friends, husbands and partners.
That stated, it remains important to assert that the primary victim usually
suffers more harm than others, and any accountability model must assume this
starting principle. However, the individual harm/rights model fails to account
for any broader community of suffering. When the perception of injury is
focused solely on the individual aspect of the experience and the recipient,
accountability mechanisms are also singular and not group in concentration.
By "group" here I imply two definitions. The first is group in its broadest
sense of ethnic, national or religious community to whom the subject of harm
belongs. The second are identifiable "others" who have co-dependent
relationships with the subjects of violation.
Why is this important? Let me first address the issue of "community" or
group harm in its broadest sense. As I will seek to illustrate, harm in war is
frequently perceived by the recipient as an attack not only on self but on the
community to whom she belongs. The injury is internalized as such, with a
cogent understanding that the object is not only her body but the dignity of her
community and the broader identity of her people. Thus, many women clearly
understand that the "harm" being done to them is not just sexual and not just
personal, though the experience of it is overwhelmingly personal. In this way,
many woman internalize what I claim as a premise at the outset of this article:
their bodies are the means to achieve particular military objectives, be they the
attempted eradication of an entire people, the facilitation of ethnic cleansing,
or to symbolically cripple the nation by desecrating its symbolic purity-its
women. Critics may argue that existing mechanisms of accountability are
sufficient insofar as they facilitate legal liability for the personal trauma
experienced by individual women, and thus, the duty of redress is fulfilled. I
would like to suggest otherwise.
In exploring the terrain of broader harms we must keep the following in
mind: Many acts of sexual violence during war are not private acts. Unlike the
experience of gendered violence during peacetime, which is predominantly
located in the domain of the private, the home, sexual violence during war is
strikingly public. Women are raped in front of their families and their
communities, and acts of sexual conquest are flouted as a means to
demonstrate the humiliation of the loser and the advantage of the victor. There
is a measurable community of harm in such contexts. The legal question is
perhaps how do we quantify that harm, how do we measure it, and how do we
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compensate and punish for its experience?
There are particular extremes of such harm. When a woman is sexually
assaulted in front of her community or those in intimate relationship with her,
there is a quantifiable harm to the passive and subjugated onlookers. Their
presence is a required element of the ritual of violation. The rationale for this
is at least two-fold. First, the observer's presence is required because sexual
violation is not only a sexual act but an aggressive act. 117 More importantly, it
is an aggressive act in the context of war, where the message is one of the
primacy of the combatant over the civilian. Second, as Scarry has noted, the
destruction of culture is part of the logic of the violence itself.118 Women's
defilement is not simply a message of sexual assault to the victim herself, it is
a message to her community. This is made all the more explicit when that
community whether familial or other is forced to participate as observers to
the act.
Recognizing this community raises some profound and difficult questions
for feminist theory. Is the harm I identify related to the perceptions of honor
historically attached to virtuous womanhood?" 9 Is the harm connected to the
loss of masculine power demonstrated in the inability to protect "their"
women from external plunder? 120 Though legal systems have punished the
particular sexual offense of rape for thousands of years, current feminist
critiques of rape law fairly thoroughly negate the normative significance of
such practices, focusing on the end of such laws as reinforcing the interests of
males in controlling sexual access to females. 121 Thus, there is a cogent
117. See Ruth Seifert, The Second Front: The Logic of Sexual Violence in War, 19 WOMEN'S STUD.
INT'L FORUM 35, 36 (1996).
118. See ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE WORLD (1985).
119. For example the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague
Convention IV) does not explicitly enumerate rape as a violation of the laws and customs of war. Article 46
of the Convention states in part: "Family honor and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well
as religious convictions and practices must be respected." Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 205 Consol. T.S. 277, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF
WAR 44 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 1982). The notion of female honor was specifically included
in the prohibitions of the Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 27. Paragraph 2 enumerates that "[w]omen
shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced
prostitution, or any form of indecent assault." Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 27, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. Notably, international law
here has its roots in domestic legal provisions concerning crimes of honor. Thus, for example, the French
Penal Code Article 324 (which was abolished on November 7, 1975 by Article 17 in law no. 617/75) reads:
Pourra beneficier d'une excuse absolutoire quiconque, ayant surpris son conjoint, son ascendante,
sa descendante ou sa souer en flagrant delit d'adultere ou de rapports sexuels illegitimes avec un
tiers se sera rendu coupable sur la personne de l'un ou l'autre de ces derniers, d'homicide ou de
lesion non premedites. L'auteur de l'homicide ou de la lesion pourra beneficier d'une excuse
attenuante s'il a surpris son conjoint, son ascendante, sa descendante ou sa soeur avec un tiers dans
une attitude equivoque.
EMILE GARCON, CODE PENAL ANNOTE 151 (1952).
120. Many ancient codes linked the legal treatment of rape to the victim's relationship with a man.
Thus, Deutermony 22:23-29 categorizes victims as betrothed or unbetrothed virgins; the penalty for rape of
an unbetrothed virgin was marriage. Anthropological evidence also reflects this pattern. Among aboriginal
peoples, much customary law is devoted to the payment of compensation to a man whose legal rights to
control sexual access to his wife or daughter is disregarded. See, e.g., E. ADAMSON HOBEL, THE LAW OF
PRIMITIVE MAN 119-20 (1968).
121. The most influential feminist critique in this vein is SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILLS
16-30 (1975).
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danger that a recognition of a broader shared harm of sexual violation may
serve to inadvertently revalidate a discourse of ownership over the sexual
purity of the female and the linking of that purity to the status of men with
whom she has relationships. Further overshadowing any such proposal is the
historical refusal to grant and protect women's autonomy and property,
including the property of their own bodies. 122 Hence while the experience of a
broader harm made be genuine and deeply felt, it is also potentially located in
a version of female status that is troubling. Though such disturbing questions
arise, there is yet another way to conceptualize injury.
This task requires a general movement away from individual theories of
right toward broader communal and derivative locations of entitlement and
thus redress when injury occurs. It requires us to recognize that sex-based
harm in war has unique characteristics that should not be overlooked when
reconceptualizing mechanisms of penal sanction and remedy. The primary
acceptance must be that sex-based harm can (though not necessarily always
must) serve a dual function for the perpetrator. That functionality by definition
may affect individuals and groups beyond the primary victim. This does not
mean that we lose sight of nor diminish the individual harm experienced by
the primary victim; quite the opposite is true. We must accept both primary
and secondary harms and by extension rights.
We must be prepared to reimagine the concept of "communal" harm as
inclusive of a broad and non-exclusionary definition of the community.
Communal harm in this context cannot and should not mean patriarchial harm.
The community of harm is both male and female. It consists of daughters,
mothers, sisters, and grandmothers as much as it does of fathers and husbands.
An idealized notion of the communal harm may be far from the practical
reality of the lives lived in most Western and non-Western societies. But to
abandon the possibility of its gestation is a disservice to the context in which
most women and men live out their ordinary lives. Reimagining communities
of equality is part of the broader project of international human rights law, in
striving to observe and enforce its central equality and non-discrimination
provisions within states' domestic practices. Thus, it is not impractical to
suggest that such communities may be appropriate locations for
acknowledging that the harm to the one may be a harm to all. Ultimately we
must be wary of an outright unwillingness to explore an expanded panoply of
legal protections simply because they raise the ghosts of patriarchal injustice.
D. Who Counts as a Victim?
Let me now turn to the second category: the codependent individuals who
122. It bears reminding that early jurisprudential regulation of gender relationships merged women's
legal identities with that of their husbands. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 442 ("[T]he
very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and
consolidated into that of her husband ... under whose wing, she performs everything.").
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experience a domino harm from the experiences of the primary subject of
violation. One outstanding challenge posed to the post-war world of rights
relates to the bearers of entitlement. As I have suggested in brief above,
exclusive binary relationships between state and individual are too narrow a
viewfinder to explain the way in which violations may actually be
experienced. But more than this, they may also be insufficient to take account
of a wider class of victims which may result from a single act. To begin, let
me put the argument in a factual context. I have outlined above a catalogue of
indignities experienced by women during the Holocaust in terms of their
effects on the female person. Here the descriptive model conforms to the
paradigmatic basis upon which individual conceptions of entitlement are
based: a person experiences harm; the harm is legally defined and subject to
sanction; the individual seeks and receives redress. So far so good. However,
what if we look past the individual who has experienced the primary harm and
view the shadows around her? What of her partner, family, and friends? We
must visualize a context in which the damage caused to X is perceived, felt,
and actualized as a harm by others linked to X because of emotional, familial,
and communal bonds. It is also grasped by X herself as a harm intended to
produce that effect. The victim also understands that she is not the sole target
of the act, but that the perpetrator expects and seeks its communicated value to
those in relationship with her.
As a starting point, I suggest there is that there is a distinct harm caused to
the linked observer, as demonstrated in the extreme observer position
identified previously. But the linked observer position is not the only one
which leads to my position on shared entitlement. International human rights
law to some degree, albeit in a different context, already facilitates the
articulation of entitlement by persons other than the primary victim. This
articulation is found in the enforcement provisions of the major international
human rights treaties including the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights 123 and the European Convention on Human Rights. 124 Under
these treaty enforcement provisions, there exists a legal basis for individual
litigation premised on the definition of "victim" in international law. A
"victim" has procedural standing to proceed with a claim against a state for a
violation of defined treaty rights. Under the applicable law, a "victim" need
not be the primary subject of violation. Indeed the jurisprudence of both the
Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights (each to
varying degrees) expressly recognize that the "victim" with standing to
proceed can be a family member, partner, or person(s) in close non-familial
relationship with the primary victim. Implicit in the existing jurisprudence is
the premise that the third party is claiming in part to themselves the rights
123. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st
Sess., Supp No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (Mar. 23, 1976).
124. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213
U.N.T.S. 221, Eur. T.S. No. 5 (Sept. 3, 1953).
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denied to the primary victim. Standing itself means an implicit recognition of
the validity of claim for violation, premised on a relationship of familial or
emotional proximity. We recognize that "something" valued is lost in the
violative process, which another person (not the primary victim) has a stake
in, by allowing this third party standing. Clearly third party standing may also
simply be a procedural necessity in certain cases. For example, where the
primary victim has been killed, she is obviously not in a position to assert a
claim for violation against the state in her own right. But necessity alone does
not explain this procedural device. Rather, on some instinctive level, it also
responds to a need to value and acknowledge the interest and stake that
international law gives to relationships of proximity when violation occurs. If
our starting point is here, its existence also points to the possibility for
meaningful expansion of that value past the procedural to the substantive.
I would argue that both the community and those in specific codependent
relationships with the primary subject of violation have much in common as
we seek to create a model of rights entitlement that can encompass both kinds
of broader entitlement. In both cases the harm has its roots in a certain stake
that the linked observer has in the entitlements of the primary victim. Another
way to describe this is that we may be shareholders in the rights belonging
primarily to another person. A closer look at the concept of shareholding can
shed some useful light on the analysis undertaken here. It signifies both a
communal and individual endeavor bound into one another in a codependent
relationship. It is a relationship of autonomous codependency, where the
actions of one can and do affect the other. In the usual course of events, that
shareholding gives us no lien over the actions, choices, and free will of the
other.
However, where the entitlements of the other have been violated, a
quantifiable harm may be caused to the shareholder. How do we measure that
harm and how is it justifiable? This harm will only make sense if we move
away from the idea that rights belong in a free-standing way to unattached
autonomous individuals. Only when we see persons as infinitely connected to
their families and their communities can we begin to see how that connection
gives one person a quantifiable interest in the maintenance of equilibrium for
another. Hence, when parents, partners, or children are forced to be observers
to the violations experienced by a woman (both temporally and
psychologically in the aftermath of violation) as child, wife, partner, or mother
there may be quantifiable harms caused to that person. 125 Conceivably the
further the link from the primary subject of violation the more likely that a
125. The lack of understanding as to the nature of harms caused is not only limited to the legal field.
Judith Pinter has been undertaking interesting work of the failure of the Western psychological model to
account for the trauma experienced by women and children in the former Yugoslavia. What she has cogently
demonstrated is that the Western model of "one on one" counseling has proven to be inadequate to respond
to the actuality of group victimhood. Notes from conference proceedings (Nov. 20, 1997), JUSTICE AND
SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION: A CONFERENCE ON THE EXPERIENCE OF BOSNIA AND THE RULE OF LAW (on file
with author).
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gradient of remedies comes into play. Equally, the notion of a community
harm, while based on the same premise as the codependent harm, can be
distinguished in terms of remedy received by the group or community
asserting the broader violation.
The existing framework of international human rights and humanitarian
law does not name or envision such broader rights. It certainly defines the
primary act of violation as harm and as a violation of entitlement, but an
underlying text of autonomy prevents any further rights from being
recognized. I stress again that what I outline here is not a conception of rights
which derives from a separate entitlement belonging exclusively to the
observer. Rather it is a derivative entitlement based on a share in the
maintenance of rights for the other with whom one has familial or communal
links. This tells me that when we reconceptualize rights in this way (which
conforms with empirical experience) the scheme appears profoundly different
from existing frameworks. Rights take on a multi-party structure, where the
number and nature of the persons who may have ownership over any one right
is varied and diverse. We see a trilateral rope rather than a single thread
between the state and the individual derived from each articulated treaty right.
The state is at one end, the individual title holder is in the middle, and there is
a spray of threads connecting the middle to multiple persons with whom there
is a connection of interest in the maintenance of right for the primary
shareholder.
VI. CONCLUDING COMMENTS.
As I have sought to articulate in this article, there remain tremendous gaps
in our understanding of the lived actuality of sex-based violence during war.
Historical examination of the formative period of international legal norms
has much to teach us of what has been missed by observers, jurists, and
prosecutors. A deeper understanding of this "thicker" history is a means to
allow for development of more sophisticated legal conceptualization of
accountability. Elaborate and nuanced legality lies within the international
community's grasp in this arena. However, it can only be realized by a
willingness to acknowledge the structural deficiencies of existing norms. That
is to say, in articulating new or more detailed existing norms, the international
community must be prepared to say that its understanding of sexual violation
may not have been deep enough, or is premised on notions of the female self
that have little to do with how women actually experience and understand
harms done to them.
Reexamining the prevalence and forms of sexual violence experienced by
women during the Holocaust has some very important consequences.
Primarily it reclaims a historical record of the war period that is under-
acknowledged. In doing so we facilitate a reappraisal of international legal
sanctions whose roots and causality are frequently traced to the
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cathartic experiences of the Second World War. At its most simplistic, we
need to understand why it is that while women experienced gross violations of
human rights during the war, there is little evidence that criminal
accountability was sought for such actions in the post-war period, or that
positive legal prohibitions were put in place to prevent the recurrence of such
acts.
What is also revealed by scrutiny of the war-time period are the limitations
of the legal vocabulary we bring with us to name and place the harms that
were caused to women as women during that time. In a sense, this tells us that
while international law has progressed significantly in the naming of harms
that women experience both by the state and third party actors in situations of
war, we cannot be complacent and assume that the task is complete. The
Holocaust has been described as the monstrous experience that forced states to
move beyond sovereignty, beyond indignation at external intervention in their
internal affairs and gave voice to a new vocabulary of protection for the
singular person. Acknowledging that some voices were not fully heard or
understood at the post-war historical moment may tell us that there is still
some shoring up to be done on those foundations. At this later historical
moment we may be better equipped to hear what is being said by women
about what happened to them during the Holocaust, to internalize and
understand the harms they identify, and to translate those harms to sanctions.
In doing so we give history the benefit of facilitating and encouraging legal
transformation, as we learn from looking backward.
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